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No Attacker Needed: Unintentional Cross-User Contamination in Shared-State LLM Agents

arXiv Security Archived Apr 03, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2604.01350v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM-based agents increasingly operate across repeated sessions, maintaining task states to ensure continuity. In many deployments, a single agent serves multiple users within a team or organization, reusing a shared knowledge layer across user identities. This shared persistence expands the failure surface: information that is locally valid for one user can silently degrade another user's outcome when the agent reapplies it without regard for sco

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    Computer Science > Computation and Language [Submitted on 1 Apr 2026] No Attacker Needed: Unintentional Cross-User Contamination in Shared-State LLM Agents Tiankai Yang, Jiate Li, Yi Nian, Shen Dong, Ruiyao Xu, Ryan Rossi, Kaize Ding, Yue Zhao LLM-based agents increasingly operate across repeated sessions, maintaining task states to ensure continuity. In many deployments, a single agent serves multiple users within a team or organization, reusing a shared knowledge layer across user identities. This shared persistence expands the failure surface: information that is locally valid for one user can silently degrade another user's outcome when the agent reapplies it without regard for scope. We refer to this failure mode as unintentional cross-user contamination (UCC). Unlike adversarial memory poisoning, UCC requires no attacker; it arises from benign interactions whose scope-bound artifacts persist and are later misapplied. We formalize UCC through a controlled evaluation protocol, introduce a taxonomy of three contamination types, and evaluate the problem in two shared-state mechanisms. Under raw shared state, benign interactions alone produce contamination rates of 57--71%. A write-time sanitization is effective when shared state is conversational, but leaves substantial residual risk when shared state includes executable artifacts, with contamination often manifesting as silent wrong answers. These results indicate that shared-state agents need artifact-level defenses beyond text-level sanitization to prevent silent cross-user failures. Subjects: Computation and Language (cs.CL); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2604.01350 [cs.CL]   (or arXiv:2604.01350v1 [cs.CL] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.01350 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Tiankai Yang [view email] [v1] Wed, 1 Apr 2026 20:03:56 UTC (614 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CL < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI cs.CR References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 03, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 03, 2026
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