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Combating Data Laundering in LLM Training

arXiv Security Archived Apr 03, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2604.01904v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Data rights owners can detect unauthorized data use in large language model (LLM) training by querying with proprietary samples. Often, superior performance (e.g., higher confidence or lower loss) on a sample relative to the untrained data implies it was part of the training corpus, as LLMs tend to perform better on data they have seen during training. However, this detection becomes fragile under data laundering, a practice of transforming the sty

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✦ AI Summary · Claude Sonnet


    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 2 Apr 2026] Combating Data Laundering in LLM Training Muxing Li, Zesheng Ye, Sharon Li, Feng Liu Data rights owners can detect unauthorized data use in large language model (LLM) training by querying with proprietary samples. Often, superior performance (e.g., higher confidence or lower loss) on a sample relative to the untrained data implies it was part of the training corpus, as LLMs tend to perform better on data they have seen during training. However, this detection becomes fragile under data laundering, a practice of transforming the stylistic form of proprietary data, while preserving critical information to obfuscate data provenance. When an LLM is trained exclusively on such laundered variants, it no longer performs better on originals, erasing the signals that standard detections rely on. We counter this by inferring the unknown laundering transformation from black-box access to the target LLM and, via an auxiliary LLM, synthesizing queries that mimic the laundered data, even if rights owners have only the originals. As the search space of finding true laundering transformations is infinite, we abstract such a process into a high-level transformation goal (e.g., "lyrical rewriting") and concrete details (e.g., "with vivid imagery"), and introduce synthesis data reversion (SDR) that instantiates this abstraction. SDR first identifies the most probable goal for synthesis to narrow the search; it then iteratively refines details so that synthesized queries gradually elicit stronger detection signals from the target LLM. Evaluated on the MIMIR benchmark against diverse laundering practices and target LLM families (Pythia, Llama2, and Falcon), SDR consistently strengthens data misuse detection, providing a practical countermeasure to data laundering. Comments: 27 pages, 2 figures Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2604.01904 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2604.01904v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.01904 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Muxing Li [view email] [v1] Thu, 2 Apr 2026 11:19:49 UTC (635 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 03, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 03, 2026
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