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Safety, Security, and Cognitive Risks in World Models

arXiv Security Archived Apr 03, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2604.01346v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: World models -- learned internal simulators of environment dynamics -- are rapidly becoming foundational to autonomous decision-making in robotics, autonomous vehicles, and agentic AI. Yet this predictive power introduces a distinctive set of safety, security, and cognitive risks. Adversaries can corrupt training data, poison latent representations, and exploit compounding rollout errors to cause catastrophic failures in safety-critical deployments

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 1 Apr 2026] Safety, Security, and Cognitive Risks in World Models Manoj Parmar World models -- learned internal simulators of environment dynamics -- are rapidly becoming foundational to autonomous decision-making in robotics, autonomous vehicles, and agentic AI. Yet this predictive power introduces a distinctive set of safety, security, and cognitive risks. Adversaries can corrupt training data, poison latent representations, and exploit compounding rollout errors to cause catastrophic failures in safety-critical deployments. World model-equipped agents are more capable of goal misgeneralisation, deceptive alignment, and reward hacking precisely because they can simulate the consequences of their own actions. Authoritative world model predictions further foster automation bias and miscalibrated human trust that operators lack the tools to audit. This paper surveys the world model landscape; introduces formal definitions of trajectory persistence and representational risk; presents a five-profile attacker capability taxonomy; and develops a unified threat model extending MITRE ATLAS and the OWASP LLM Top 10 to the world model stack. We provide an empirical proof-of-concept on trajectory-persistent adversarial attacks (GRU-RSSM: A_1 = 2.26x amplification, -59.5% reduction under adversarial fine-tuning; stochastic RSSM proxy: A_1 = 0.65x; DreamerV3 checkpoint: non-zero action drift confirmed). We illustrate risks through four deployment scenarios and propose interdisciplinary mitigations spanning adversarial hardening, alignment engineering, NIST AI RMF and EU AI Act governance, and human-factors design. We argue that world models must be treated as safety-critical infrastructure requiring the same rigour as flight-control software or medical devices. Comments: 26 pages, 1 figure (6 panels), 2 tables. Empirical proof-of-concept on GRU/RSSM/DreamerV3 architectures Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG); Robotics (cs.RO) Cite as: arXiv:2604.01346 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2604.01346v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.01346 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Manojkumar Parmar [view email] [v1] Wed, 1 Apr 2026 19:57:33 UTC (69 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI cs.LG cs.RO References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 03, 2026
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    Apr 03, 2026
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