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Obfuscating Code Vulnerabilities against Static Analysis in JavaScript Code

arXiv Security Archived Apr 02, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2604.01131v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Code obfuscation is widely adopted in modern software development to protect intellectual property and hinder reverse engineering, but it also provides attackers with a powerful means to conceal malicious logic inside otherwise legitimate JavaScript code. In a software supply chain where a single compromised package can affect thousands of applications, this raises a critical question: how robust are the Static Application Security Testing (SAST) t

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 1 Apr 2026] Obfuscating Code Vulnerabilities against Static Analysis in JavaScript Code Francesco Pagano, Lorenzo Pisu, Leonardo Regano, Davide Maiorca, Alessio Merlo, Giorgio Giacinto Code obfuscation is widely adopted in modern software development to protect intellectual property and hinder reverse engineering, but it also provides attackers with a powerful means to conceal malicious logic inside otherwise legitimate JavaScript code. In a software supply chain where a single compromised package can affect thousands of applications, this raises a critical question: how robust are the Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tools that CI/CD pipelines rely on as automated security gatekeepers? This paper answers that question by empirically quantifying the impact of JavaScript obfuscation on state-of-practice SAST. We define a realistic supply-chain threat model in which an adversary injects vulnerable code and iteratively obfuscates it until the pipeline reports a clean scan. To measure the resulting degradation, we introduce the Vulnerability Detection Loss (VDL) metric and conduct a two-phase study. First, we analyze 16 vulnerable-by-design this http URL web applications from the OWASP directory; second, we extend the analysis to 260 in-the-wild JavaScript/Node.js projects from GitHub. Across both datasets, we apply eight semantics-preserving obfuscation techniques and their combinations and evaluate two representative SAST tools, Njsscan and Bearer. Even a single obfuscation technique typically suppresses most baseline findings, including high-severity issues, while stacking techniques yield near-total evasion, with VDL often approaching 100%. Our results show that current JavaScript SAST is fundamentally not robust against commonplace obfuscations and that "clean" reports on obfuscated code may offer only a false sense of security. Finally, we discuss practical mitigation guidelines and directions for obfuscation-aware analysis. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2604.01131 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2604.01131v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.01131 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Leonardo Regano [view email] [v1] Wed, 1 Apr 2026 16:52:37 UTC (756 KB) Access Paper: view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 02, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 02, 2026
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