When Safe Models Merge into Danger: Exploiting Latent Vulnerabilities in LLM Fusion
arXiv SecurityArchived Apr 02, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2604.00627v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Model merging has emerged as a powerful technique for combining specialized capabilities from multiple fine-tuned LLMs without additional training costs. However, the security implications of this widely-adopted practice remain critically underexplored. In this work, we reveal that model merging introduces a novel attack surface that can be systematically exploited to compromise safety alignment. We present TrojanMerge,, a framework that embeds lat
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 1 Apr 2026]
When Safe Models Merge into Danger: Exploiting Latent Vulnerabilities in LLM Fusion
Jiaqing Li, Zhibo Zhang, Shide Zhou, Yuxi Li, Tianlong Yu, Kailong Wang
Model merging has emerged as a powerful technique for combining specialized capabilities from multiple fine-tuned LLMs without additional training costs. However, the security implications of this widely-adopted practice remain critically underexplored. In this work, we reveal that model merging introduces a novel attack surface that can be systematically exploited to compromise safety alignment. We present TrojanMerge,, a framework that embeds latent malicious components into source models that remain individually benign but produce severely misaligned models when merged. Our key insight is formulating this attack as a constrained optimization problem: we construct perturbations that preserve source model safety through directional consistency constraints, maintain capabilities via Frobenius directional alignment constraints, yet combine during merging to form pre-computed attack vectors. Extensive experiments across 9 LLMs from 3 model families demonstrate that TrojanMerge, consistently achieves high harmful response rates in merged models while source models maintain safety scores comparable to unmodified versions. Our attack succeeds across diverse merging algorithms and remains effective under various hyperparameter configurations. These findings expose fundamental vulnerabilities in current model merging practices and highlight the urgent need for security-aware mechanisms.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2604.00627 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2604.00627v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.00627
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From: Jiaqing Li [view email]
[v1] Wed, 1 Apr 2026 08:32:46 UTC (1,562 KB)
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