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RAGShield: Provenance-Verified Defense-in-Depth Against Knowledge Base Poisoning in Government Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systems

arXiv Security Archived Apr 02, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2604.00387v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: RAG systems deployed across federal agencies for citizen-facing services are vulnerable to knowledge base poisoning attacks, where adversaries inject malicious documents to manipulate outputs. Recent work demonstrates that as few as 10 adversarial passages can achieve 98.2% retrieval success rates. We observe that RAG knowledge base poisoning is structurally analogous to software supply chain attacks, and propose RAGShield, a five-layer defense-in-

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 1 Apr 2026] RAGShield: Provenance-Verified Defense-in-Depth Against Knowledge Base Poisoning in Government Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systems KrishnaSaiReddy Patil RAG systems deployed across federal agencies for citizen-facing services are vulnerable to knowledge base poisoning attacks, where adversaries inject malicious documents to manipulate outputs. Recent work demonstrates that as few as 10 adversarial passages can achieve 98.2% retrieval success rates. We observe that RAG knowledge base poisoning is structurally analogous to software supply chain attacks, and propose RAGShield, a five-layer defense-in-depth framework applying supply chain provenance verification to the RAG knowledge pipeline. RAGShield introduces: (1) C2PA-inspired cryptographic document attestation blocking unsigned and forged documents at ingestion; (2) trust-weighted retrieval prioritizing provenance-verified sources; (3) a formal taint lattice with cross-source contradiction detection catching insider threats even when provenance is valid; (4) provenance-aware generation with auditable citations; and (5) NIST SP 800-53 compliance mapping across 15 control families. Evaluation on a 500-passage Natural Questions corpus with 63 attack documents and 200 queries against five adversary tiers achieves 0.0% attack success rate including adaptive attacks (95% CI: [0.0%, 1.9%]) with 0.0% false positive rate. We honestly report that insider in-place replacement attacks achieve 17.5% ASR, identifying the fundamental limit of ingestion-time defense. The cross-source contradiction detector catches subtle numerical manipulation attacks that bypass provenance verification entirely. Comments: 8 pages, 8 tables, 2 figures Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2604.00387 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2604.00387v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.00387 Focus to learn more Submission history From: KrishnaSaiReddy Patil [view email] [v1] Wed, 1 Apr 2026 02:16:42 UTC (16 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 02, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 02, 2026
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