RAGShield: Provenance-Verified Defense-in-Depth Against Knowledge Base Poisoning in Government Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systems
arXiv SecurityArchived Apr 02, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2604.00387v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: RAG systems deployed across federal agencies for citizen-facing services are vulnerable to knowledge base poisoning attacks, where adversaries inject malicious documents to manipulate outputs. Recent work demonstrates that as few as 10 adversarial passages can achieve 98.2% retrieval success rates. We observe that RAG knowledge base poisoning is structurally analogous to software supply chain attacks, and propose RAGShield, a five-layer defense-in-
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 1 Apr 2026]
RAGShield: Provenance-Verified Defense-in-Depth Against Knowledge Base Poisoning in Government Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systems
KrishnaSaiReddy Patil
RAG systems deployed across federal agencies for citizen-facing services are vulnerable to knowledge base poisoning attacks, where adversaries inject malicious documents to manipulate outputs. Recent work demonstrates that as few as 10 adversarial passages can achieve 98.2% retrieval success rates. We observe that RAG knowledge base poisoning is structurally analogous to software supply chain attacks, and propose RAGShield, a five-layer defense-in-depth framework applying supply chain provenance verification to the RAG knowledge pipeline. RAGShield introduces: (1) C2PA-inspired cryptographic document attestation blocking unsigned and forged documents at ingestion; (2) trust-weighted retrieval prioritizing provenance-verified sources; (3) a formal taint lattice with cross-source contradiction detection catching insider threats even when provenance is valid; (4) provenance-aware generation with auditable citations; and (5) NIST SP 800-53 compliance mapping across 15 control families. Evaluation on a 500-passage Natural Questions corpus with 63 attack documents and 200 queries against five adversary tiers achieves 0.0% attack success rate including adaptive attacks (95% CI: [0.0%, 1.9%]) with 0.0% false positive rate. We honestly report that insider in-place replacement attacks achieve 17.5% ASR, identifying the fundamental limit of ingestion-time defense. The cross-source contradiction detector catches subtle numerical manipulation attacks that bypass provenance verification entirely.
Comments: 8 pages, 8 tables, 2 figures
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
Cite as: arXiv:2604.00387 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2604.00387v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.00387
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From: KrishnaSaiReddy Patil [view email]
[v1] Wed, 1 Apr 2026 02:16:42 UTC (16 KB)
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