On the Necessity of Pre-agreed Secrets for Thwarting Last-minute Coercion: Vulnerabilities and Lessons From the Loki E-voting Protocol
arXiv SecurityArchived Apr 02, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2604.00188v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Coercion-resistance (CR) is a crucial security property in e-voting systems. It ensures that an attacker cannot compel a voter to vote in a specific way by using threats or rewards. The Loki e-voting protocol, proposed by Giustolisi \emph{et al.} at IEEE S\&P (2024), introduces a novel design that mitigates last-minute coercion through a re-voting mechanism. It also aims to address the usability issues of the seminal JCJ e-voting protocol, specific
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 31 Mar 2026]
On the Necessity of Pre-agreed Secrets for Thwarting Last-minute Coercion: Vulnerabilities and Lessons From the Loki E-voting Protocol
Jingxin Qiao, Myrto Arapinis, Thomas Zacharias
Coercion-resistance (CR) is a crucial security property in e-voting systems. It ensures that an attacker cannot compel a voter to vote in a specific way by using threats or rewards. The Loki e-voting protocol, proposed by Giustolisi \emph{et al.} at IEEE S\&P (2024), introduces a novel design that mitigates last-minute coercion through a re-voting mechanism. It also aims to address the usability issues of the seminal JCJ e-voting protocol, specifically: i) the requirement that voters can store and hide pre-agreed credentials, and ii) the ability of voters to convincingly lie while being coerced.
In this work, we identify two vulnerabilities in Loki. The first is a brute-force attack that compromises the integrity of the evasion strategy. Specifically, this attack allows an adversary to cast a ballot on behalf of their victim in a way that the evasion strategy cannot defend against, rendering it ineffective. The second vulnerability is a forced abstention attack, which allows an adversary to detect when their victim has complied with their instruction not to vote. We generalise the integrity attack to reveal a fundamental dilemma: without pre-agreed secret credentials, it is not possible to prevent last-minute coercion. Finally, we show how reverting to pre-agreed secret credentials fixes the aforementioned vulnerabilities and discuss the trade-off between tallying efficiency and stronger trust assumptions.
Comments: Extended version of a paper appearing at CSF'26
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2604.00188 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2604.00188v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.00188
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Submission history
From: Jingxin Qiao [view email]
[v1] Tue, 31 Mar 2026 19:40:55 UTC (135 KB)
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