HPCCFA: Leveraging Hardware Performance Counters for Control Flow Attestation
arXiv SecurityArchived Apr 01, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2603.29749v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) allow the secure execution of code on remote systems without the need to trust their operators. They use static attestation as a central mechanism for establishing trust, allowing remote parties to verify that their code is executed unmodified in an isolated environment. However, this form of attestation does not cover runtime attacks, where an attacker exploits vulnerabilities in the software inside the TEE. C
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 31 Mar 2026]
HPCCFA: Leveraging Hardware Performance Counters for Control Flow Attestation
Claudius Pott, Luca Wilke, Jan Wichelmann, Thomas Eisenbarth
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) allow the secure execution of code on remote systems without the need to trust their operators. They use static attestation as a central mechanism for establishing trust, allowing remote parties to verify that their code is executed unmodified in an isolated environment. However, this form of attestation does not cover runtime attacks, where an attacker exploits vulnerabilities in the software inside the TEE. Control Flow Attestation (CFA), a form of runtime attestation, is designed to detect such attacks.
In this work, we present a method to extend TEEs with CFA and discuss how it can prevent exploitation in the event of detected control flow violations. Furthermore, we introduce HPCCFA, a mechanism that uses HPCs for CFA purposes, enabling hardware-backed trace generation on commodity CPUs. We demonstrate the feasibility of HPCCFA on a proof-of-concept implementation for Keystone on RISC-V. Our evaluation investigates the interplay of the number of measurement points and runtime protection, and reveals a trade-off between detection reliability and performance overhead.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.29749 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2603.29749v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.29749
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Submission history
From: Claudius Pott [view email]
[v1] Tue, 31 Mar 2026 13:51:30 UTC (439 KB)
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