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An Empirical Comparison of Security and Privacy Characteristics of Android Messaging Apps

arXiv Security Archived Apr 01, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2603.29668v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Mobile messaging apps are a fundamental communication infrastructure, used by billions of people every day to share information, including sensitive data. Security and Privacy are thus critical concerns for such applications. Although the cryptographic protocols prevalent in messaging apps are generally well studied, other relevant implementation characteristics of such apps, such as their software architecture, permission use, and network-related

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 31 Mar 2026] An Empirical Comparison of Security and Privacy Characteristics of Android Messaging Apps Ioannis Karyotakis, Foivos Timotheos Proestakis, Evangelos Talos, Diomidis Spinellis, Nikolaos Alexopoulos Mobile messaging apps are a fundamental communication infrastructure, used by billions of people every day to share information, including sensitive data. Security and Privacy are thus critical concerns for such applications. Although the cryptographic protocols prevalent in messaging apps are generally well studied, other relevant implementation characteristics of such apps, such as their software architecture, permission use, and network-related runtime behavior, have not received enough attention. In this paper, we present a methodology for comparing implementation characteristics of messaging applications by employing static and dynamic analysis under reproducible scenarios to identify discrepancies with potential security and privacy implications. We apply this methodology to study the Android clients of the Meta Messenger, Signal, and Telegram apps. Our main findings reveal discrepancies in application complexity, attack surface, and network behavior. Statically, Messenger presents the largest attack surface and the highest number of static analysis warnings, while Telegram requests the most dangerous permissions. In contrast, Signal consistently demonstrates a minimalist design with the fewest dependencies and dangerous permissions. Dynamically, these differences are reflected in network activity; Messenger is by far the most active, exhibiting persistent background communication, whereas Signal is the least active. Furthermore, our analysis shows that all applications properly adhere to the Android permission model, with no evidence of unauthorized data access. Comments: 8 pages, 1 figure, 8 tables Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2603.29668 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2603.29668v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.29668 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Ioannis Karyotakis [view email] [v1] Tue, 31 Mar 2026 12:27:28 UTC (387 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-03 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 01, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 01, 2026
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