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Deep Learning-Assisted Improved Differential Fault Attacks on Lightweight Stream Ciphers

arXiv Security Archived Apr 01, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2603.29382v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Lightweight cryptographic primitives are widely deployed in resource-constraint environment, particularly in the Internet of Things (IoT) devices. Due to their public accessibility, these devices are vulnerable to physical attacks, especially fault attacks. Recently, deep learning-based cryptanalytic techniques have demonstrated promising results; however, their application to fault attacks remains limited, particularly for stream ciphers. In this

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 31 Mar 2026] Deep Learning-Assisted Improved Differential Fault Attacks on Lightweight Stream Ciphers Kok Ping Lim, Dongyang Jia, Iftekhar Salam Lightweight cryptographic primitives are widely deployed in resource-constraint environment, particularly in the Internet of Things (IoT) devices. Due to their public accessibility, these devices are vulnerable to physical attacks, especially fault attacks. Recently, deep learning-based cryptanalytic techniques have demonstrated promising results; however, their application to fault attacks remains limited, particularly for stream ciphers. In this work, we investigate the feasibility of deep learning assisted differential fault attack on three lightweight stream ciphers, namely ACORNv3, MORUSv2 and ATOM, under a relaxed fault model, where a single-bit bit-flipping fault is injected at an unknown location. We train multilayer perceptron (MLP) models to identify the fault locations. Experimental results show that the trained models achieve high identification accuracies of 0.999880, 0.999231 and 0.823568 for ACORNv3, MORUSv2 and ATOM, respectively, and outperform traditional signature-based methods. For the secret recovery process, we introduce a threshold-based method to optimize the number of fault injections required to recover the secret information. The results show that the initial state of ACORN can be recovered with 21 to 34 faults; while MORUS requires 213 to 248 faults, with at most 6 bits of guessing. Both attacks reduce the attack complexity compared to existing works. For ATOM, the results show that it possesses a higher security margin, as majority of state bits in the Non-linear Feedback Shift Register (NFSR) can only be recovered under a precise control model. To the best of our knowledge, this work provides the first experimental results of differential fault attacks on ATOM. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Machine Learning (cs.LG) Cite as: arXiv:2603.29382 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2603.29382v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.29382 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Iftekhar Salam [view email] [v1] Tue, 31 Mar 2026 07:50:59 UTC (234 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-03 Change to browse by: cs cs.LG References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 01, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 01, 2026
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