CyberIntel ⬡ News
★ Saved ◆ Cyber Reads
← Back ◬ AI & Machine Learning Apr 01, 2026

Beyond Corner Patches: Semantics-Aware Backdoor Attack in Federated Learning

arXiv Security Archived Apr 01, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2603.29328v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Backdoor attacks on federated learning (FL) are most often evaluated with synthetic corner patches or out-of-distribution (OOD) patterns that are unlikely to arise in practice. In this paper, we revisit the backdoor threat to standard FL (a single global model) under a more realistic setting where triggers must be semantically meaningful, in-distribution, and visually plausible. We propose SABLE, a Semantics-Aware Backdoor for LEarning in federated

Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary · Claude Sonnet


    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 31 Mar 2026] Beyond Corner Patches: Semantics-Aware Backdoor Attack in Federated Learning Kavindu Herath, Joshua Zhao, Saurabh Bagchi Backdoor attacks on federated learning (FL) are most often evaluated with synthetic corner patches or out-of-distribution (OOD) patterns that are unlikely to arise in practice. In this paper, we revisit the backdoor threat to standard FL (a single global model) under a more realistic setting where triggers must be semantically meaningful, in-distribution, and visually plausible. We propose SABLE, a Semantics-Aware Backdoor for LEarning in federated settings, which constructs natural, content-consistent triggers (e.g., semantic attribute changes such as sunglasses) and optimizes an aggregation-aware malicious objective with feature separation and parameter regularization to keep attacker updates close to benign ones. We instantiate SABLE on CelebA hair-color classification and the German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark (GTSRB), poisoning only a small, interpretable subset of each malicious client's local data while otherwise following the standard FL protocol. Across heterogeneous client partitions and multiple aggregation rules (FedAvg, Trimmed Mean, MultiKrum, and FLAME), our semantics-driven triggers achieve high targeted attack success rates while preserving benign test accuracy. These results show that semantics-aligned backdoors remain a potent and practical threat in federated learning, and that robustness claims based solely on synthetic patch triggers can be overly optimistic. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (cs.CV); Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing (cs.DC); Machine Learning (cs.LG) Cite as: arXiv:2603.29328 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2603.29328v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.29328 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Kavindu Herath [view email] [v1] Tue, 31 Mar 2026 06:48:25 UTC (2,778 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-03 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI cs.CV cs.DC cs.LG References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
    💬 Team Notes
    Article Info
    Source
    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 01, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 01, 2026
    Full Text
    ✓ Saved locally
    Open Original ↗