Attesting LLM Pipelines: Enforcing Verifiable Training and Release Claims
arXiv SecurityArchived Apr 01, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2603.28988v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Modern Large Language Model (LLM) systems are assembled from third-party artifacts such as pre-trained weights, fine-tuning adapters, datasets, dependency packages, and container images, fetched through automated pipelines. This speed comes with supply-chain risks, including compromised dependencies, malicious hub artifacts, unsafe deserialization, forged provenance, and backdoored models. A core gap is that training and release claims (e.g., data
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 30 Mar 2026]
Attesting LLM Pipelines: Enforcing Verifiable Training and Release Claims
Zhuoran Tan, Jeremy Singer, Christos Anagnostopoulos
Modern Large Language Model (LLM) systems are assembled from third-party artifacts such as pre-trained weights, fine-tuning adapters, datasets, dependency packages, and container images, fetched through automated pipelines. This speed comes with supply-chain risks, including compromised dependencies, malicious hub artifacts, unsafe deserialization, forged provenance, and backdoored models. A core gap is that training and release claims (e.g., data and code lineage, build environment, and security scanning results) are rarely cryptographically bound to the artifacts they describe, making enforcement inconsistent across teams and stages. We propose an attestation-aware promotion gate: before an artifact is admitted into trusted environments (training, fine-tuning, deployment), the gate verifies claim evidence, enforces safe loading and static scanning policies, and applies secure-by-default deployment constraints. When organizations operate runtime security tooling, the same gate can optionally ingest standardized dynamic signals via plugins to reduce uncertainty for high-risk artifacts. We outline a practical claims-to-controls mapping and an evaluation blueprint using representative supply-chain scenarios and operational metrics (coverage and decisions), charting a path toward a full research paper.
Comments: This paper has been accepted at The 2nd International Workshop on Large Language Model Supply Chain Analysis (LLMSC 2026)
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.28988 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2603.28988v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.28988
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Submission history
From: Zhuoran Tan [view email]
[v1] Mon, 30 Mar 2026 20:37:48 UTC (131 KB)
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