CyberIntel ⬡ News
★ Saved ◆ Cyber Reads
← Back ◬ AI & Machine Learning Apr 01, 2026

SNEAKDOOR: Stealthy Backdoor Attacks against Distribution Matching-based Dataset Condensation

arXiv Security Archived Apr 01, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2603.28824v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Dataset condensation aims to synthesize compact yet informative datasets that retain the training efficacy of full-scale data, offering substantial gains in efficiency. Recent studies reveal that the condensation process can be vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where malicious triggers are injected into the condensation dataset, manipulating model behavior during inference. While prior approaches have made progress in balancing attack success rate an

Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary · Claude Sonnet


    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 29 Mar 2026] SNEAKDOOR: Stealthy Backdoor Attacks against Distribution Matching-based Dataset Condensation He Yang, Dongyi Lv, Song Ma, Wei Xi, Jizhong Zhao Dataset condensation aims to synthesize compact yet informative datasets that retain the training efficacy of full-scale data, offering substantial gains in efficiency. Recent studies reveal that the condensation process can be vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where malicious triggers are injected into the condensation dataset, manipulating model behavior during inference. While prior approaches have made progress in balancing attack success rate and clean test accuracy, they often fall short in preserving stealthiness, especially in concealing the visual artifacts of condensed data or the perturbations introduced during inference. To address this challenge, we introduce Sneakdoor, which enhances stealthiness without compromising attack effectiveness. Sneakdoor exploits the inherent vulnerability of class decision boundaries and incorporates a generative module that constructs input-aware triggers aligned with local feature geometry, thereby minimizing detectability. This joint design enables the attack to remain imperceptible to both human inspection and statistical detection. Extensive experiments across multiple datasets demonstrate that Sneakdoor achieves a compelling balance among attack success rate, clean test accuracy, and stealthiness, substantially improving the invisibility of both the synthetic data and triggered samples while maintaining high attack efficacy. The code is available at this https URL. Comments: 29 pages, 5 figures, accepted to NeurIPS 2025 Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2603.28824 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2603.28824v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.28824 Focus to learn more Submission history From: He Yang [view email] [v1] Sun, 29 Mar 2026 09:00:25 UTC (2,762 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-03 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
    💬 Team Notes
    Article Info
    Source
    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 01, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 01, 2026
    Full Text
    ✓ Saved locally
    Open Original ↗