SNEAKDOOR: Stealthy Backdoor Attacks against Distribution Matching-based Dataset Condensation
arXiv SecurityArchived Apr 01, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2603.28824v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Dataset condensation aims to synthesize compact yet informative datasets that retain the training efficacy of full-scale data, offering substantial gains in efficiency. Recent studies reveal that the condensation process can be vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where malicious triggers are injected into the condensation dataset, manipulating model behavior during inference. While prior approaches have made progress in balancing attack success rate an
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 29 Mar 2026]
SNEAKDOOR: Stealthy Backdoor Attacks against Distribution Matching-based Dataset Condensation
He Yang, Dongyi Lv, Song Ma, Wei Xi, Jizhong Zhao
Dataset condensation aims to synthesize compact yet informative datasets that retain the training efficacy of full-scale data, offering substantial gains in efficiency. Recent studies reveal that the condensation process can be vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where malicious triggers are injected into the condensation dataset, manipulating model behavior during inference. While prior approaches have made progress in balancing attack success rate and clean test accuracy, they often fall short in preserving stealthiness, especially in concealing the visual artifacts of condensed data or the perturbations introduced during inference. To address this challenge, we introduce Sneakdoor, which enhances stealthiness without compromising attack effectiveness. Sneakdoor exploits the inherent vulnerability of class decision boundaries and incorporates a generative module that constructs input-aware triggers aligned with local feature geometry, thereby minimizing detectability. This joint design enables the attack to remain imperceptible to both human inspection and statistical detection. Extensive experiments across multiple datasets demonstrate that Sneakdoor achieves a compelling balance among attack success rate, clean test accuracy, and stealthiness, substantially improving the invisibility of both the synthetic data and triggered samples while maintaining high attack efficacy. The code is available at this https URL.
Comments: 29 pages, 5 figures, accepted to NeurIPS 2025
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.28824 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2603.28824v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.28824
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From: He Yang [view email]
[v1] Sun, 29 Mar 2026 09:00:25 UTC (2,762 KB)
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