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"What Did It Actually Do?": Understanding Risk Awareness and Traceability for Computer-Use Agents

arXiv Security Archived Mar 31, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2603.28551v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Personalized computer-use agents are rapidly moving from expert communities into mainstream use. Unlike conventional chatbots, these systems can install skills, invoke tools, access private resources, and modify local environments on users' behalf. Yet users often do not know what authority they have delegated, what the agent actually did during task execution, or whether the system has been safely removed afterward. We investigate this gap as a co

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 30 Mar 2026] "What Did It Actually Do?": Understanding Risk Awareness and Traceability for Computer-Use Agents Zifan Peng Personalized computer-use agents are rapidly moving from expert communities into mainstream use. Unlike conventional chatbots, these systems can install skills, invoke tools, access private resources, and modify local environments on users' behalf. Yet users often do not know what authority they have delegated, what the agent actually did during task execution, or whether the system has been safely removed afterward. We investigate this gap as a combined problem of risk understanding and post-hoc auditability, using OpenClaw as a motivating case. We first build a multi-source corpus of the OpenClaw ecosystem, including incidents, advisories, malicious-skill reports, news coverage, tutorials, and social-media narratives. We then conduct an interview study to examine how users and practitioners understand skills, autonomy, privilege, persistence, and uninstallation. Our findings suggest that participants often recognized these systems as risky in the abstract, but lacked concrete mental models of what skills can do, what resources agents can access, and what changes may remain after execution or removal. Motivated by these findings, we propose AgentTrace, a traceability framework and prototype interface for visualizing agent actions, touched resources, permission history, provenance, and persistent side effects. A scenario-based evaluation suggests that traceability-oriented interfaces can improve understanding of agent behavior, support anomaly detection, and foster more calibrated trust. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Emerging Technologies (cs.ET); Human-Computer Interaction (cs.HC); Multiagent Systems (cs.MA) Cite as: arXiv:2603.28551 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2603.28551v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.28551 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Zifan Peng [view email] [v1] Mon, 30 Mar 2026 15:12:55 UTC (23,561 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-03 Change to browse by: cs cs.ET cs.HC cs.MA References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Mar 31, 2026
    Archived
    Mar 31, 2026
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