"What Did It Actually Do?": Understanding Risk Awareness and Traceability for Computer-Use Agents
arXiv SecurityArchived Mar 31, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2603.28551v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Personalized computer-use agents are rapidly moving from expert communities into mainstream use. Unlike conventional chatbots, these systems can install skills, invoke tools, access private resources, and modify local environments on users' behalf. Yet users often do not know what authority they have delegated, what the agent actually did during task execution, or whether the system has been safely removed afterward. We investigate this gap as a co
Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 30 Mar 2026]
"What Did It Actually Do?": Understanding Risk Awareness and Traceability for Computer-Use Agents
Zifan Peng
Personalized computer-use agents are rapidly moving from expert communities into mainstream use. Unlike conventional chatbots, these systems can install skills, invoke tools, access private resources, and modify local environments on users' behalf. Yet users often do not know what authority they have delegated, what the agent actually did during task execution, or whether the system has been safely removed afterward.
We investigate this gap as a combined problem of risk understanding and post-hoc auditability, using OpenClaw as a motivating case. We first build a multi-source corpus of the OpenClaw ecosystem, including incidents, advisories, malicious-skill reports, news coverage, tutorials, and social-media narratives. We then conduct an interview study to examine how users and practitioners understand skills, autonomy, privilege, persistence, and uninstallation. Our findings suggest that participants often recognized these systems as risky in the abstract, but lacked concrete mental models of what skills can do, what resources agents can access, and what changes may remain after execution or removal. Motivated by these findings, we propose AgentTrace, a traceability framework and prototype interface for visualizing agent actions, touched resources, permission history, provenance, and persistent side effects. A scenario-based evaluation suggests that traceability-oriented interfaces can improve understanding of agent behavior, support anomaly detection, and foster more calibrated trust.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Emerging Technologies (cs.ET); Human-Computer Interaction (cs.HC); Multiagent Systems (cs.MA)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.28551 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2603.28551v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.28551
Focus to learn more
Submission history
From: Zifan Peng [view email]
[v1] Mon, 30 Mar 2026 15:12:55 UTC (23,561 KB)
Access Paper:
HTML (experimental)
view license
Current browse context:
cs.CR
< prev | next >
new | recent | 2026-03
Change to browse by:
cs
cs.ET
cs.HC
cs.MA
References & Citations
NASA ADS
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Export BibTeX Citation
Bookmark
Bibliographic Tools
Bibliographic and Citation Tools
Bibliographic Explorer Toggle
Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?)
Connected Papers Toggle
Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?)
Litmaps Toggle
Litmaps (What is Litmaps?)
scite.ai Toggle
scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?)
Code, Data, Media
Demos
Related Papers
About arXivLabs
Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)