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Kill-Chain Canaries: Stage-Level Tracking of Prompt Injection Across Attack Surfaces and Model Safety Tiers

arXiv Security Archived Mar 31, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2603.28013v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We present a stage-decomposed analysis of prompt injection attacks against five frontier LLM agents. Prior work measures task-level attack success rate (ASR); we localize the pipeline stage at which each model's defense activates. We instrument every run with a cryptographic canary token (SECRET-[A-F0-9]{8}) tracked through four kill-chain stages -- Exposed, Persisted, Relayed, Executed -- across four attack surfaces and five defense conditions (76

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 30 Mar 2026] Kill-Chain Canaries: Stage-Level Tracking of Prompt Injection Across Attack Surfaces and Model Safety Tiers Haochuan Kevin Wang We present a stage-decomposed analysis of prompt injection attacks against five frontier LLM agents. Prior work measures task-level attack success rate (ASR); we localize the pipeline stage at which each model's defense activates. We instrument every run with a cryptographic canary token (SECRET-[A-F0-9]{8}) tracked through four kill-chain stages -- Exposed, Persisted, Relayed, Executed -- across four attack surfaces and five defense conditions (764 total runs, 428 no-defense attacked). Our central finding is that model safety is determined not by whether adversarial content is seen, but by whether it is propagated across pipeline stages. Concretely: (1) in our evaluation, exposure is 100% for all five models -- the safety gap is entirely downstream; (2) Claude strips injections at write_memory summarization (0/164 ASR), while GPT-4o-mini propagates canaries without loss (53% ASR, 95% CI: 41--65%); (3) DeepSeek exhibits 0% ASR on memory surfaces and 100% ASR on tool-stream surfaces from the same model -- a complete reversal across injection channels; (4) all four active defense conditions (write_filter, pi_detector, spotlighting, and their combination) produce 100% ASR due to threat-model surface mismatch; (5) a Claude relay node decontaminates downstream agents -- 0/40 canaries survived into shared memory. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG) MSC classes: I.2.7, K.6.5, C.2.0 ACM classes: I.2.7; K.6.5; C.2.0 Cite as: arXiv:2603.28013 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2603.28013v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.28013 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Haochuan Wang [view email] [v1] Mon, 30 Mar 2026 04:07:18 UTC (958 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-03 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI cs.LG References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Mar 31, 2026
    Archived
    Mar 31, 2026
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