A Systematic Taxonomy of Security Vulnerabilities in the OpenClaw AI Agent Framework
arXiv SecurityArchived Mar 31, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2603.27517v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI agent frameworks connecting large language model (LLM) reasoning to host execution surfaces--shell, filesystem, containers, and messaging--introduce security challenges structurally distinct from conventional software. We present a systematic taxonomy of 190 advisories filed against OpenClaw, an open-source AI agent runtime, organized by architectural layer and trust-violation type. Vulnerabilities cluster along two orthogonal axes: (1) the syst
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 29 Mar 2026]
A Systematic Taxonomy of Security Vulnerabilities in the OpenClaw AI Agent Framework
Surada Suwansathit, Yuxuan Zhang, Guofei Gu
AI agent frameworks connecting large language model (LLM) reasoning to host execution surfaces--shell, filesystem, containers, and messaging--introduce security challenges structurally distinct from conventional software. We present a systematic taxonomy of 190 advisories filed against OpenClaw, an open-source AI agent runtime, organized by architectural layer and trust-violation type. Vulnerabilities cluster along two orthogonal axes: (1) the system axis, reflecting the architectural layer (exec policy, gateway, channel, sandbox, browser, plugin, agent/prompt); and (2) the attack axis, reflecting adversarial techniques (identity spoofing, policy bypass, cross-layer composition, prompt injection, supply-chain escalation).
Patch-differential evidence yields three principal findings. First, three Moderate- or High-severity advisories in the Gateway and Node-Host subsystems compose into a complete unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) path--spanning delivery, exploitation, and command-and-control--from an LLM tool call to the host process. Second, the exec allowlist, the primary command-filtering mechanism, relies on a closed-world assumption that command identity is recoverable via lexical parsing. This is invalidated by shell line continuation, busybox multiplexing, and GNU option abbreviation. Third, a malicious skill distributed via the plugin channel executed a two-stage dropper within the LLM context, bypassing the exec pipeline and demonstrating that the skill distribution surface lacks runtime policy enforcement. The dominant structural weakness is per-layer trust enforcement rather than unified policy boundaries, making cross-layer attacks resilient to local remediation.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.27517 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2603.27517v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.27517
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Submission history
From: Yuxuan Zhang [view email]
[v1] Sun, 29 Mar 2026 04:51:27 UTC (236 KB)
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