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HFIPay: Privacy-Preserving, Cross-Chain Cryptocurrency Payments to Human-Friendly Identifiers

arXiv Security Archived Mar 31, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2603.26970v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Sending cryptocurrency to an email address or phone number should be as simple as a bank transfer, yet naive schemes that map identifiers directly to blockchain addresses expose the recipient's balances and transaction history to anyone who knows the identifier. HFIPay separates private routing, sender-side quote verification, and on-chain claim authorization. A relay resolves the human-friendly identifier off-chain and commits only a per-intent bl

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 27 Mar 2026] HFIPay: Privacy-Preserving, Cross-Chain Cryptocurrency Payments to Human-Friendly Identifiers Jian Sheng Wang Sending cryptocurrency to an email address or phone number should be as simple as a bank transfer, yet naive schemes that map identifiers directly to blockchain addresses expose the recipient's balances and transaction history to anyone who knows the identifier. HFIPay separates private routing, sender-side quote verification, and on-chain claim authorization. A relay resolves the human-friendly identifier off-chain and commits only a per-intent blinded binding rho_i plus the quoted payment tuple; the chain sees neither the identifier nor a reusable recipient tag. In a verified-quote deployment, the relay returns a sender-verifiable off-chain proof linking rho_i to an attested binding-key commitment, so the relay cannot substitute a different recipient before funding. To claim, the recipient proves in zero knowledge -- via ZK-ACE -- that the funded intent's blinded binding matches a handle derived from the same deterministic identity, authorizing release of the quoted asset and amount to a chosen destination. We formalize two privacy goals: enumeration resistance and pre-claim unlinkability, and distinguish a baseline deployment (relay trusted for binding correctness) from the verified-quote deployment (binding is sender-verifiable without a public registry). When composed with an NVM runtime, the same mechanism extends to cross-chain settlement. The result is a relay-assisted but non-custodial architecture: relays are privacy and availability dependencies, but cannot redirect funds. Comments: 26 pages, 2 figures Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing (cs.DC) Cite as: arXiv:2603.26970 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2603.26970v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.26970 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Jian Sheng Wang [view email] [v1] Fri, 27 Mar 2026 20:26:17 UTC (25 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-03 Change to browse by: cs cs.DC References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Mar 31, 2026
    Archived
    Mar 31, 2026
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