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Protecting User Prompts Via Character-Level Differential Privacy

arXiv Security Archived Mar 30, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2603.26032v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) generate responses based on user prompts. Often, these prompts may contain highly sensitive information, including personally identifiable information (PII), which could be exposed to third parties hosting these models. In this work, we propose a new method to sanitize user prompts. Our mechanism uses the randomized response mechanism of differential privacy to randomly and independently perturb each character in a word

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 27 Mar 2026] Protecting User Prompts Via Character-Level Differential Privacy Shashie Dilhara Batan Arachchige, Hassan Jameel Asghar, Benjamin Zi Hao Zhao, Dinusha Vatsalan, Dali Kaafar Large Language Models (LLMs) generate responses based on user prompts. Often, these prompts may contain highly sensitive information, including personally identifiable information (PII), which could be exposed to third parties hosting these models. In this work, we propose a new method to sanitize user prompts. Our mechanism uses the randomized response mechanism of differential privacy to randomly and independently perturb each character in a word. The perturbed text is then sent to a remote LLM, which first performs a prompt restoration and subsequently performs the intended downstream task. The idea is that the restoration will be able to reconstruct non-sensitive words even when they are perturbed due to cues from the context, as well as the fact that these words are often very common. On the other hand, perturbation would make reconstruction of sensitive words difficult because they are rare. We experimentally validate our method on two datasets, i2b2/UTHealth and Enron, using two LLMs: Llama-3.1 8B Instruct and GPT-4o mini. We also compare our approach with a word-level differentially private mechanism, and with a rule-based PII redaction baseline, using a unified privacy-utility evaluation. Our results show that sensitive PII tagged in these datasets are reconstructed at a rate close to the theoretical rate of reconstructing completely random words, whereas non-sensitive words are reconstructed at a much higher rate. Our method has the advantage that it can be applied without explicitly identifying sensitive pieces of information in the prompt, while showing a good privacy-utility tradeoff for downstream tasks. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2603.26032 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2603.26032v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.26032 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Shashie Dilhara Batan Arachchige [view email] [v1] Fri, 27 Mar 2026 03:02:05 UTC (430 KB) Access Paper: view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-03 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Mar 30, 2026
    Archived
    Mar 30, 2026
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