Disguising Topology and Side-Channel Information through Covert Gate- and ML-Enabled IP Camouflaging
arXiv SecurityArchived Mar 30, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2603.25904v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Semiconductor intellectual property (IP) theft incurs hundreds of billions in annual losses, driven by advanced reverse engineering (RE) techniques. Traditional ``cryptic'' IC camouflaging methods typically focus on hiding localized gate functionality but remain vulnerable to system-level structural analysis. This paper explores ``mimetic deception,'' where a functional IP (F) is designed to structurally and visually masquerade as a completely diff
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 26 Mar 2026]
Disguising Topology and Side-Channel Information through Covert Gate- and ML-Enabled IP Camouflaging
Junling Fan, David Koblah, Domenic Forte
Semiconductor intellectual property (IP) theft incurs hundreds of billions in annual losses, driven by advanced reverse engineering (RE) techniques. Traditional ``cryptic'' IC camouflaging methods typically focus on hiding localized gate functionality but remain vulnerable to system-level structural analysis. This paper explores ``mimetic deception,'' where a functional IP (F) is designed to structurally and visually masquerade as a completely different appearance IP (A). We provide a comprehensive evaluation of three deceptive methodologies: IP Camouflage, Graph Matching, and DNAS-NAND Gate Array, analyzing their resilience against GNN-based node classification, and Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Crucially, we demonstrate that mimetic deception achieves a novel anti-side-channel defense: by forcing the mis-classification of cryptographic primitives, the adversary is led to apply an incorrect power model, causing the DPA attack to fail. Our results validate that this multi-layered approach effectively thwarts the entire RE toolchain by poisoning the structural and logical data used for netlist understanding.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.25904 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2603.25904v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.25904
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From: Junling Fan [view email]
[v1] Thu, 26 Mar 2026 20:53:10 UTC (648 KB)
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