Amplified Patch-Level Differential Privacy for Free via Random Cropping
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arXiv:2603.24695v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Random cropping is one of the most common data augmentation techniques in computer vision, yet the role of its inherent randomness in training differentially private machine learning models has thus far gone unexplored. We observe that when sensitive content in an image is spatially localized, such as a face or license plate, random cropping can probabilistically exclude that content from the model's input. This introduces a third source of stoch
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Computer Science > Machine Learning
[Submitted on 25 Mar 2026]
Amplified Patch-Level Differential Privacy for Free via Random Cropping
Kaan Durmaz, Jan Schuchardt, Sebastian Schmidt, Stephan Günnemann
Random cropping is one of the most common data augmentation techniques in computer vision, yet the role of its inherent randomness in training differentially private machine learning models has thus far gone unexplored. We observe that when sensitive content in an image is spatially localized, such as a face or license plate, random cropping can probabilistically exclude that content from the model's input. This introduces a third source of stochasticity in differentially private training with stochastic gradient descent, in addition to gradient noise and minibatch sampling. This additional randomness amplifies differential privacy without requiring changes to model architecture or training procedure. We formalize this effect by introducing a patch-level neighboring relation for vision data and deriving tight privacy bounds for differentially private stochastic gradient descent (DP-SGD) when combined with random cropping. Our analysis quantifies the patch inclusion probability and shows how it composes with minibatch sampling to yield a lower effective sampling rate. Empirically, we validate that patch-level amplification improves the privacy-utility trade-off across multiple segmentation architectures and datasets. Our results demonstrate that aligning privacy accounting with domain structure and additional existing sources of randomness can yield stronger guarantees at no additional cost.
Comments: Published at TMLR
Subjects: Machine Learning (cs.LG); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (cs.CV)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.24695 [cs.LG]
(or arXiv:2603.24695v1 [cs.LG] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.24695
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Journal reference: Transactions on Machine Learning Research, 2026, ISSN 2835-8856
Submission history
From: Kaan Durmaz [view email]
[v1] Wed, 25 Mar 2026 18:15:06 UTC (11,159 KB)
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