Shape and Substance: Dual-Layer Side-Channel Attacks on Local Vision-Language Models
arXiv SecurityArchived Mar 27, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2603.25403v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: On-device Vision-Language Models (VLMs) promise data privacy via local execution. However, we show that the architectural shift toward Dynamic High-Resolution preprocessing (e.g., AnyRes) introduces an inherent algorithmic side-channel. Unlike static models, dynamic preprocessing decomposes images into a variable number of patches based on their aspect ratio, creating workload-dependent inputs. We demonstrate a dual-layer attack framework against l
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 26 Mar 2026]
Shape and Substance: Dual-Layer Side-Channel Attacks on Local Vision-Language Models
Eyal Hadad, Mordechai Guri
On-device Vision-Language Models (VLMs) promise data privacy via local execution. However, we show that the architectural shift toward Dynamic High-Resolution preprocessing (e.g., AnyRes) introduces an inherent algorithmic side-channel. Unlike static models, dynamic preprocessing decomposes images into a variable number of patches based on their aspect ratio, creating workload-dependent inputs. We demonstrate a dual-layer attack framework against local VLMs. In Tier 1, an unprivileged attacker can exploit significant execution-time variations using standard unprivileged OS metrics to reliably fingerprint the input's geometry. In Tier 2, by profiling Last-Level Cache (LLC) contention, the attacker can resolve semantic ambiguity within identical geometries, distinguishing between visually dense (e.g., medical X-rays) and sparse (e.g., text documents) content. By evaluating state-of-the-art models such as LLaVA-NeXT and Qwen2-VL, we show that combining these signals enables reliable inference of privacy-sensitive contexts. Finally, we analyze the security engineering trade-offs of mitigating this vulnerability, reveal substantial performance overhead with constant-work padding, and propose practical design recommendations for secure Edge AI deployments.
Comments: 13 pages, 8 figures
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.25403 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2603.25403v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.25403
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Submission history
From: Eyal Hadad [view email]
[v1] Thu, 26 Mar 2026 12:53:49 UTC (5,693 KB)
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