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Shape and Substance: Dual-Layer Side-Channel Attacks on Local Vision-Language Models

arXiv Security Archived Mar 27, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2603.25403v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: On-device Vision-Language Models (VLMs) promise data privacy via local execution. However, we show that the architectural shift toward Dynamic High-Resolution preprocessing (e.g., AnyRes) introduces an inherent algorithmic side-channel. Unlike static models, dynamic preprocessing decomposes images into a variable number of patches based on their aspect ratio, creating workload-dependent inputs. We demonstrate a dual-layer attack framework against l

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 26 Mar 2026] Shape and Substance: Dual-Layer Side-Channel Attacks on Local Vision-Language Models Eyal Hadad, Mordechai Guri On-device Vision-Language Models (VLMs) promise data privacy via local execution. However, we show that the architectural shift toward Dynamic High-Resolution preprocessing (e.g., AnyRes) introduces an inherent algorithmic side-channel. Unlike static models, dynamic preprocessing decomposes images into a variable number of patches based on their aspect ratio, creating workload-dependent inputs. We demonstrate a dual-layer attack framework against local VLMs. In Tier 1, an unprivileged attacker can exploit significant execution-time variations using standard unprivileged OS metrics to reliably fingerprint the input's geometry. In Tier 2, by profiling Last-Level Cache (LLC) contention, the attacker can resolve semantic ambiguity within identical geometries, distinguishing between visually dense (e.g., medical X-rays) and sparse (e.g., text documents) content. By evaluating state-of-the-art models such as LLaVA-NeXT and Qwen2-VL, we show that combining these signals enables reliable inference of privacy-sensitive contexts. Finally, we analyze the security engineering trade-offs of mitigating this vulnerability, reveal substantial performance overhead with constant-work padding, and propose practical design recommendations for secure Edge AI deployments. Comments: 13 pages, 8 figures Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG) Cite as: arXiv:2603.25403 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2603.25403v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.25403 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Eyal Hadad [view email] [v1] Thu, 26 Mar 2026 12:53:49 UTC (5,693 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-03 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI cs.LG References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Mar 27, 2026
    Archived
    Mar 27, 2026
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