zk-X509: Privacy-Preserving On-Chain Identity from Legacy PKI via Zero-Knowledge Proofs
arXiv SecurityArchived Mar 27, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2603.25190v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Public blockchains impose an inherent tension between regulatory compliance and user privacy. Existing on-chain identity solutions require centralized KYC attestors, specialized hardware, or Decentralized Identifier (DID) frameworks needing entirely new credential infrastructure. Meanwhile, over four billion active X.509 certificates constitute a globally deployed, government-grade trust infrastructure largely unexploited for decentralized identity
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 26 Mar 2026]
zk-X509: Privacy-Preserving On-Chain Identity from Legacy PKI via Zero-Knowledge Proofs
Yeongju Bak (Tokamak Network, Seoul, South Korea)
Public blockchains impose an inherent tension between regulatory compliance and user privacy. Existing on-chain identity solutions require centralized KYC attestors, specialized hardware, or Decentralized Identifier (DID) frameworks needing entirely new credential infrastructure. Meanwhile, over four billion active X.509 certificates constitute a globally deployed, government-grade trust infrastructure largely unexploited for decentralized identity.
This paper presents zk-X509, a privacy-preserving identity system bridging legacy Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) with public ledgers via a RISC-V zero-knowledge virtual machine (zkVM). Users prove ownership of standard X.509 certificates without revealing private keys or personal identifiers. Crucially, the private key never enters the ZK circuit; ownership is proven via OS keychain signature delegation (e.g., macOS Secure Enclave, Windows TPM). The circuit verifies certificate chain validity, temporal validity, key ownership, trustless CRL revocation, blockchain address binding, and Sybil-resistant nullifier generation. It commits 13 public values, including a Certificate Authority (CA) Merkle root hiding the issuing CA, and four selective disclosure hashes.
We formalize eight security properties under a Dolev-Yao adversary with game-based definitions and reductions to sEUF-CMA, SHA-256 collision resistance, and ZK soundness. Evaluated on the SP1 zkVM, the system achieves 11.8M cycles for ECDSA P-256 (17.4M for RSA-2048), with on-chain Groth16 verification costing ~300K gas. By leveraging certificates deployed at scale across jurisdictions, zk-X509 enables adoption without new trust establishment, complementing emerging DID-based systems.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Computers and Society (cs.CY); Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing (cs.DC)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.25190 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2603.25190v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.25190
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From: Yeongju Bak [view email]
[v1] Thu, 26 Mar 2026 08:55:26 UTC (45 KB)
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