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PIDP-Attack: Combining Prompt Injection with Database Poisoning Attacks on Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systems

arXiv Security Archived Mar 27, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2603.25164v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across a wide range of applications. However, their practical deployment is often hindered by issues such as outdated knowledge and the tendency to generate hallucinations. To address these limitations, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems have been introduced, enhancing LLMs with external, up-to-date knowledge sources. Despite their advantages, RAG systems remain vulnera

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 26 Mar 2026] PIDP-Attack: Combining Prompt Injection with Database Poisoning Attacks on Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systems Haozhen Wang, Haoyue Liu, Jionghao Zhu, Zhichao Wang, Yongxin Guo, Xiaoying Tang Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across a wide range of applications. However, their practical deployment is often hindered by issues such as outdated knowledge and the tendency to generate hallucinations. To address these limitations, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems have been introduced, enhancing LLMs with external, up-to-date knowledge sources. Despite their advantages, RAG systems remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks, with data poisoning emerging as a prominent threat. Existing poisoning-based attacks typically require prior knowledge of the user's specific queries, limiting their flexibility and real-world applicability. In this work, we propose PIDP-Attack, a novel compound attack that integrates prompt injection with database poisoning in RAG. By appending malicious characters to queries at inference time and injecting a limited number of poisoned passages into the retrieval database, our method can effectively manipulate LLM response to arbitrary query without prior knowledge of the user's actual query. Experimental evaluations across three benchmark datasets (Natural Questions, HotpotQA, MS-MARCO) and eight LLMs demonstrate that PIDP-Attack consistently outperforms the original PoisonedRAG. Specifically, our method improves attack success rates by 4% to 16% on open-domain QA tasks while maintaining high retrieval precision, proving that the compound attack strategy is both necessary and highly effective. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2603.25164 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2603.25164v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.25164 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Haoyue Liu [view email] [v1] Thu, 26 Mar 2026 08:30:18 UTC (2,758 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-03 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Mar 27, 2026
    Archived
    Mar 27, 2026
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