AIP: Agent Identity Protocol for Verifiable Delegation Across MCP and A2A
arXiv SecurityArchived Mar 27, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2603.24775v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI agents increasingly call tools via the Model Context Protocol (MCP) and delegate to other agents via Agent-to-Agent (A2A), yet neither protocol verifies agent identity. A scan of approximately 2,000 MCP servers found all lacked authentication. In our survey, we did not identify a prior implemented protocol that jointly combines public-key verifiable delegation, holder-side attenuation, expressive chained policy, transport bindings across MCP/A2A
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 25 Mar 2026]
AIP: Agent Identity Protocol for Verifiable Delegation Across MCP and A2A
Sunil Prakash
AI agents increasingly call tools via the Model Context Protocol (MCP) and delegate to other agents via Agent-to-Agent (A2A), yet neither protocol verifies agent identity. A scan of approximately 2,000 MCP servers found all lacked authentication. In our survey, we did not identify a prior implemented protocol that jointly combines public-key verifiable delegation, holder-side attenuation, expressive chained policy, transport bindings across MCP/A2A/HTTP, and provenance-oriented completion records. We introduce Invocation-Bound Capability Tokens (IBCTs), a primitive that fuses identity, attenuated authorization, and provenance binding into a single append-only token chain. IBCTs operate in two wire formats: compact mode (a signed JWT for single-hop cases) and chained mode (a Biscuit token with Datalog policies for multi-hop delegation). We provide reference implementations in Python and Rust with full cross-language interoperability. Compact mode verification takes 0.049ms (Rust) and 0.189ms (Python), with 0.22ms overhead over no-auth in real MCP-over-HTTP deployment. In a real multi-agent deployment with Gemini 2.5 Flash, AIP adds 2.35ms of overhead (0.086% of total end-to-end latency). Adversarial evaluation across 600 attack attempts shows 100% rejection rate, with two attack categories (delegation depth violation and audit evasion through empty context) uniquely caught by AIP's chained delegation model that neither unsigned nor plain JWT deployments detect.
Comments: 17 pages, 10 tables, 2 figures
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
MSC classes: 68M12, 94A60
ACM classes: D.4.6; I.2.11
Cite as: arXiv:2603.24775 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2603.24775v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.24775
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Submission history
From: Sunil Prakash [view email]
[v1] Wed, 25 Mar 2026 19:45:37 UTC (21 KB)
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