From Liar Paradox to Incongruent Sets: A Normal Form for Self-Reference
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arXiv:2603.24527v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We introduce incongruent normal form (INF), a structural representation for self-referential semantic sentences. An INF replaces a self-referential sentence with a finite family of non-self-referential sentences that are individually satisfiable but not jointly satisfiable. This transformation isolates the semantic obstruction created by self-reference while preserving classical semantics locally and is accompanied by correctness theorems character
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Computer Science > Artificial Intelligence
[Submitted on 25 Mar 2026]
From Liar Paradox to Incongruent Sets: A Normal Form for Self-Reference
Shalender Singh, Vishnu Priya Singh Parmar
We introduce incongruent normal form (INF), a structural representation for self-referential semantic sentences. An INF replaces a self-referential sentence with a finite family of non-self-referential sentences that are individually satisfiable but not jointly satisfiable. This transformation isolates the semantic obstruction created by self-reference while preserving classical semantics locally and is accompanied by correctness theorems characterizing when global inconsistency arises from locally compatible commitments. We then study the role of incongruence as a structural source of semantic informativeness. Using a minimal model-theoretic notion of informativeness-understood as the ability of sentences to distinguish among admissible models-we show that semantic completeness precludes informativeness, while incongruence preserves it. Moreover, incongruence is not confined to paradoxical constructions: any consistent incomplete first-order theory admits finite incongruent families arising from incompatible complete extensions. In this sense, incompleteness manifests structurally as locally realizable but globally incompatible semantic commitments, providing a minimal formal basis for semantic knowledge. Finally, we introduce a quantitative semantic framework. In a canonical finite semantic-state setting, we model semantic commitments as Boolean functions and define a Fourier-analytic notion of semantic energy based on total influence. We derive uncertainty-style bounds relating semantic determinacy, informativeness, and spectral simplicity, and establish a matrix inequality bounding aggregate semantic variance by total semantic energy. These results show quantitatively that semantic informativeness cannot collapse into a single determinate state without unbounded energy cost, identifying incongruence as a fundamental structural and quantitative feature of semantic representation.
Comments: 46 pages
Subjects: Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.24527 [cs.AI]
(or arXiv:2603.24527v1 [cs.AI] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.24527
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Submission history
From: Shalender Singh [view email]
[v1] Wed, 25 Mar 2026 17:04:42 UTC (931 KB)
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