When Understanding Becomes a Risk: Authenticity and Safety Risks in the Emerging Image Generation Paradigm
arXiv SecurityArchived Mar 26, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2603.24079v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Recently, multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have emerged as a unified paradigm for language and image generation. Compared with diffusion models, MLLMs possess a much stronger capability for semantic understanding, enabling them to process more complex textual inputs and comprehend richer contextual meanings. However, this enhanced semantic ability may also introduce new and potentially greater safety risks. Taking diffusion models as a re
Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
[Submitted on 25 Mar 2026]
When Understanding Becomes a Risk: Authenticity and Safety Risks in the Emerging Image Generation Paradigm
Ye Leng, Junjie Chu, Mingjie Li, Chenhao Lin, Chao Shen, Michael Backes, Yun Shen, Yang Zhang
Recently, multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have emerged as a unified paradigm for language and image generation. Compared with diffusion models, MLLMs possess a much stronger capability for semantic understanding, enabling them to process more complex textual inputs and comprehend richer contextual meanings. However, this enhanced semantic ability may also introduce new and potentially greater safety risks. Taking diffusion models as a reference point, we systematically analyze and compare the safety risks of emerging MLLMs along two dimensions: unsafe content generation and fake image synthesis. Across multiple unsafe generation benchmark datasets, we observe that MLLMs tend to generate more unsafe images than diffusion models. This difference partly arises because diffusion models often fail to interpret abstract prompts, producing corrupted outputs, whereas MLLMs can comprehend these prompts and generate unsafe content. For current advanced fake image detectors, MLLM-generated images are also notably harder to identify. Even when detectors are retrained with MLLMs-specific data, they can still be bypassed by simply providing MLLMs with longer and more descriptive inputs. Our measurements indicate that the emerging safety risks of the cutting-edge generative paradigm, MLLMs, have not been sufficiently recognized, posing new challenges to real-world safety.
Comments: Accepted by CVPR 2026. 15 pages, 11 figures
Subjects: Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (cs.CV); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.24079 [cs.CV]
(or arXiv:2603.24079v1 [cs.CV] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.24079
Focus to learn more
Submission history
From: Ye Leng [view email]
[v1] Wed, 25 Mar 2026 08:35:25 UTC (2,397 KB)
Access Paper:
HTML (experimental)
view license
Current browse context:
cs.CV
< prev | next >
new | recent | 2026-03
Change to browse by:
cs
cs.AI
cs.CR
References & Citations
NASA ADS
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Export BibTeX Citation
Bookmark
Bibliographic Tools
Bibliographic and Citation Tools
Bibliographic Explorer Toggle
Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?)
Connected Papers Toggle
Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?)
Litmaps Toggle
Litmaps (What is Litmaps?)
scite.ai Toggle
scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?)
Code, Data, Media
Demos
Related Papers
About arXivLabs
Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)