Internal Safety Collapse in Frontier Large Language Models
arXiv SecurityArchived Mar 26, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2603.23509v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This work identifies a critical failure mode in frontier large language models (LLMs), which we term Internal Safety Collapse (ISC): under certain task conditions, models enter a state in which they continuously generate harmful content while executing otherwise benign tasks. We introduce TVD (Task, Validator, Data), a framework that triggers ISC through domain tasks where generating harmful content is the only valid completion, and construct ISC
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Computation and Language
[Submitted on 4 Mar 2026]
Internal Safety Collapse in Frontier Large Language Models
Yutao Wu, Xiao Liu, Yifeng Gao, Xiang Zheng, Hanxun Huang, Yige Li, Cong Wang, Bo Li, Xingjun Ma, Yu-Gang Jiang
This work identifies a critical failure mode in frontier large language models (LLMs), which we term Internal Safety Collapse (ISC): under certain task conditions, models enter a state in which they continuously generate harmful content while executing otherwise benign tasks. We introduce TVD (Task, Validator, Data), a framework that triggers ISC through domain tasks where generating harmful content is the only valid completion, and construct ISC-Bench containing 53 scenarios across 8 professional disciplines. Evaluated on JailbreakBench, three representative scenarios yield worst-case safety failure rates averaging 95.3% across four frontier LLMs (including GPT-5.2 and Claude Sonnet 4.5), substantially exceeding standard jailbreak attacks. Frontier models are more vulnerable than earlier LLMs: the very capabilities that enable complex task execution become liabilities when tasks intrinsically involve harmful content. This reveals a growing attack surface: almost every professional domain uses tools that process sensitive data, and each new dual-use tool automatically expands this vulnerability--even without any deliberate attack. Despite substantial alignment efforts, frontier LLMs retain inherently unsafe internal capabilities: alignment reshapes observable outputs but does not eliminate the underlying risk profile. These findings underscore the need for caution when deploying LLMs in high-stakes settings. Source code: this https URL
Comments: 15 pages of the main text, qualitative examples of jailbreaks may be harmful in nature
Subjects: Computation and Language (cs.CL); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.23509 [cs.CL]
(or arXiv:2603.23509v1 [cs.CL] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.23509
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Submission history
From: Oscar Wu [view email]
[v1] Wed, 4 Mar 2026 12:55:34 UTC (3,427 KB)
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