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Towards Remote Attestation of Microarchitectural Attacks: The Case of Rowhammer

arXiv Security Archived Mar 26, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2603.24172v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Microarchitectural vulnerabilities increasingly undermine the assumption that hardware can be treated as a reliable root of trust. Prevention mechanisms often lag behind evolving attack techniques, leaving deployed systems unable to assume continued trustworthiness. We propose a shift from prevention to detection through microarchitectural-aware remote attestation. As a first instantiation of this idea, we present HammerWatch, a Rowhammer-aware rem

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✦ AI Summary · Claude Sonnet


    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 25 Mar 2026] Towards Remote Attestation of Microarchitectural Attacks: The Case of Rowhammer Martin Herrmann, Oussama Draissi, Christian Niesler, Lucas Davi Microarchitectural vulnerabilities increasingly undermine the assumption that hardware can be treated as a reliable root of trust. Prevention mechanisms often lag behind evolving attack techniques, leaving deployed systems unable to assume continued trustworthiness. We propose a shift from prevention to detection through microarchitectural-aware remote attestation. As a first instantiation of this idea, we present HammerWatch, a Rowhammer-aware remote attestation protocol that enables an external verifier to assess whether a system exhibits hardware-induced disturbance behavior. HammerWatch leverages memory-level evidence available on commodity platforms, specifically Machine-Check Exceptions (MCEs) from ECC DRAM and counter-based indicators from Per-Row Activation Counting (PRAC), and protects these measurements against kernel-level adversaries using TPM-anchored hash chains. We implement HammerWatch on commodity hardware and evaluate it on 20000 simulated benign and malicious access patterns. Our results show that the verifier reliably distinguishes Rowhammer-like behavior from benign operation under conservative heuristics, demonstrating that detection-oriented attestation is feasible and can complement incomplete prevention mechanisms Comments: 26 pages, 4 figures, 4 tables Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2603.24172 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2603.24172v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.24172 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Oussama Draissi [view email] [v1] Wed, 25 Mar 2026 10:42:08 UTC (211 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-03 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Mar 26, 2026
    Archived
    Mar 26, 2026
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