Towards Remote Attestation of Microarchitectural Attacks: The Case of Rowhammer
arXiv SecurityArchived Mar 26, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2603.24172v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Microarchitectural vulnerabilities increasingly undermine the assumption that hardware can be treated as a reliable root of trust. Prevention mechanisms often lag behind evolving attack techniques, leaving deployed systems unable to assume continued trustworthiness. We propose a shift from prevention to detection through microarchitectural-aware remote attestation. As a first instantiation of this idea, we present HammerWatch, a Rowhammer-aware rem
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 25 Mar 2026]
Towards Remote Attestation of Microarchitectural Attacks: The Case of Rowhammer
Martin Herrmann, Oussama Draissi, Christian Niesler, Lucas Davi
Microarchitectural vulnerabilities increasingly undermine the assumption that hardware can be treated as a reliable root of trust. Prevention mechanisms often lag behind evolving attack techniques, leaving deployed systems unable to assume continued trustworthiness. We propose a shift from prevention to detection through microarchitectural-aware remote attestation. As a first instantiation of this idea, we present HammerWatch, a Rowhammer-aware remote attestation protocol that enables an external verifier to assess whether a system exhibits hardware-induced disturbance behavior. HammerWatch leverages memory-level evidence available on commodity platforms, specifically Machine-Check Exceptions (MCEs) from ECC DRAM and counter-based indicators from Per-Row Activation Counting (PRAC), and protects these measurements against kernel-level adversaries using TPM-anchored hash chains. We implement HammerWatch on commodity hardware and evaluate it on 20000 simulated benign and malicious access patterns. Our results show that the verifier reliably distinguishes Rowhammer-like behavior from benign operation under conservative heuristics, demonstrating that detection-oriented attestation is feasible and can complement incomplete prevention mechanisms
Comments: 26 pages, 4 figures, 4 tables
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.24172 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2603.24172v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.24172
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Submission history
From: Oussama Draissi [view email]
[v1] Wed, 25 Mar 2026 10:42:08 UTC (211 KB)
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