The Cognitive Firewall:Securing Browser Based AI Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection Via Hybrid Edge Cloud Defense
arXiv SecurityArchived Mar 26, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2603.23791v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Deploying large language models (LLMs) as autonomous browser agents exposes a significant attack surface in the form of Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI). Cloud-based defenses can provide strong semantic analysis, but they introduce latency and raise privacy concerns. We present the Cognitive Firewall, a three-stage split-compute architecture that distributes security checks across the client and the cloud. The system consists of a local visual Senti
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 24 Mar 2026]
The Cognitive Firewall:Securing Browser Based AI Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection Via Hybrid Edge Cloud Defense
Qianlong Lan, Anuj Kaul
Deploying large language models (LLMs) as autonomous browser agents exposes a significant attack surface in the form of Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI). Cloud-based defenses can provide strong semantic analysis, but they introduce latency and raise privacy concerns. We present the Cognitive Firewall, a three-stage split-compute architecture that distributes security checks across the client and the cloud. The system consists of a local visual Sentinel, a cloud-based Deep Planner, and a deterministic Guard that enforces execution-time policies. Across 1,000 adversarial samples, edge-only defenses fail to detect 86.9% of semantic attacks. In contrast, the full hybrid architecture reduces the overall attack success rate (ASR) to below 1% (0.88% under static evaluation and 0.67% under adaptive evaluation), while maintaining deterministic constraints on side-effecting actions. By filtering presentation-layer attacks locally, the system avoids unnecessary cloud inference and achieves an approximately 17,000x latency advantage over cloud-only baselines. These results indicate that deterministic enforcement at the execution boundary can complement probabilistic language models, and that split-compute provides a practical foundation for securing interactive LLM agents.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.23791 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2603.23791v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.23791
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From: Qianlong Lan [view email]
[v1] Tue, 24 Mar 2026 23:49:15 UTC (424 KB)
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