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The Cognitive Firewall:Securing Browser Based AI Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection Via Hybrid Edge Cloud Defense

arXiv Security Archived Mar 26, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2603.23791v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Deploying large language models (LLMs) as autonomous browser agents exposes a significant attack surface in the form of Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI). Cloud-based defenses can provide strong semantic analysis, but they introduce latency and raise privacy concerns. We present the Cognitive Firewall, a three-stage split-compute architecture that distributes security checks across the client and the cloud. The system consists of a local visual Senti

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 24 Mar 2026] The Cognitive Firewall:Securing Browser Based AI Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection Via Hybrid Edge Cloud Defense Qianlong Lan, Anuj Kaul Deploying large language models (LLMs) as autonomous browser agents exposes a significant attack surface in the form of Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI). Cloud-based defenses can provide strong semantic analysis, but they introduce latency and raise privacy concerns. We present the Cognitive Firewall, a three-stage split-compute architecture that distributes security checks across the client and the cloud. The system consists of a local visual Sentinel, a cloud-based Deep Planner, and a deterministic Guard that enforces execution-time policies. Across 1,000 adversarial samples, edge-only defenses fail to detect 86.9% of semantic attacks. In contrast, the full hybrid architecture reduces the overall attack success rate (ASR) to below 1% (0.88% under static evaluation and 0.67% under adaptive evaluation), while maintaining deterministic constraints on side-effecting actions. By filtering presentation-layer attacks locally, the system avoids unnecessary cloud inference and achieves an approximately 17,000x latency advantage over cloud-only baselines. These results indicate that deterministic enforcement at the execution boundary can complement probabilistic language models, and that split-compute provides a practical foundation for securing interactive LLM agents. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2603.23791 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2603.23791v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.23791 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Qianlong Lan [view email] [v1] Tue, 24 Mar 2026 23:49:15 UTC (424 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-03 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Mar 26, 2026
    Archived
    Mar 26, 2026
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