Robust Safety Monitoring of Language Models via Activation Watermarking
arXiv SecurityArchived Mar 25, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2603.23171v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) can be misused to reveal sensitive information, such as weapon-making instructions or writing malware. LLM providers rely on $\emph{monitoring}$ to detect and flag unsafe behavior during inference. An open security challenge is $\emph{adaptive}$ adversaries who craft attacks that simultaneously (i) evade detection while (ii) eliciting unsafe behavior. Adaptive attackers are a major concern as LLM providers cannot patch
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 24 Mar 2026]
Robust Safety Monitoring of Language Models via Activation Watermarking
Toluwani Aremu, Daniil Ognev, Samuele Poppi, Nils Lukas
Large language models (LLMs) can be misused to reveal sensitive information, such as weapon-making instructions or writing malware. LLM providers rely on \emph{monitoring}$\emph{monitoring}$ to detect and flag unsafe behavior during inference. An open security challenge is \emph{adaptive}$\emph{adaptive}$ adversaries who craft attacks that simultaneously (i) evade detection while (ii) eliciting unsafe behavior. Adaptive attackers are a major concern as LLM providers cannot patch their security mechanisms, since they are unaware of how their models are being misused. We cast \emph{robust}$\emph{robust}$ LLM monitoring as a security game, where adversaries who know about the monitor try to extract sensitive information, while a provider must accurately detect these adversarial queries at low false positive rates. Our work (i) shows that existing LLM monitors are vulnerable to adaptive attackers and (ii) designs improved defenses through \emph{activation watermarking}$\emph{activation watermarking}$ by carefully introducing uncertainty for the attacker during inference. We find that \emph{activation watermarking}$\emph{activation watermarking}$ outperforms guard baselines by up to 52\% under adaptive attackers who know the monitoring algorithm but not the secret key.
Comments: 20 pages, 17 figures
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computers and Society (cs.CY); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.23171 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2603.23171v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.23171
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From: Toluwani Aremu [view email]
[v1] Tue, 24 Mar 2026 13:13:23 UTC (1,316 KB)
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