Agent-Sentry: Bounding LLM Agents via Execution Provenance
arXiv SecurityArchived Mar 25, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2603.22868v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agentic computing systems, which autonomously spawn new functionalities based on natural language instructions, are becoming increasingly prevalent. While immensely capable, these systems raise serious security, privacy, and safety concerns. Fundamentally, the full set of functionalities offered by these systems, combined with their probabilistic execution flows, is not known beforehand. Given this lack of characterization, it is non-trivial to val
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 24 Mar 2026]
Agent-Sentry: Bounding LLM Agents via Execution Provenance
Rohan Sequeira, Stavros Damianakis, Umar Iqbal, Konstantinos Psounis
Agentic computing systems, which autonomously spawn new functionalities based on natural language instructions, are becoming increasingly prevalent. While immensely capable, these systems raise serious security, privacy, and safety concerns. Fundamentally, the full set of functionalities offered by these systems, combined with their probabilistic execution flows, is not known beforehand. Given this lack of characterization, it is non-trivial to validate whether a system has successfully carried out the user's intended task or instead executed irrelevant actions, potentially as a consequence of compromise. In this paper, we propose Agent-Sentry, a framework that attempts to bound agentic systems to address this problem. Our key insight is that agentic systems are designed for specific use cases and therefore need not expose unbounded or unspecified functionalities. Once bounded, these systems become easier to scrutinize. Agent-Sentry operationalizes this insight by uncovering frequent functionalities offered by an agentic system, along with their execution traces, to construct behavioral bounds. It then learns a policy from these traces and blocks tool calls that deviate from learned behaviors or that misalign with user intent. Our evaluation shows that Agent-Sentry helps prevent over 90\% of attacks that attempt to trigger out-of-bounds executions, while preserving up to 98\% of system utility.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.22868 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2603.22868v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.22868
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Submission history
From: Rohan Sequeira [view email]
[v1] Tue, 24 Mar 2026 07:12:53 UTC (568 KB)
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