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Combinatorial Privacy: Private Multi-Party Bitstream Grand Sum by Hiding in Birkhoff Polytopes

arXiv Security Archived Mar 25, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2603.22808v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We introduce PolyVeil, a protocol for private Boolean summation across $k$ clients that encodes private bits as permutation matrices in the Birkhoff polytope. A two-layer architecture gives the server perfect simulation-based security (statistical distance zero) while a separate aggregator faces \#P-hard likelihood inference via the permanent and mixed discriminant. Two variants (full and compressed) differ in what the aggregator observes. We devel

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 24 Mar 2026] Combinatorial Privacy: Private Multi-Party Bitstream Grand Sum by Hiding in Birkhoff Polytopes Praneeth Vepakomma We introduce PolyVeil, a protocol for private Boolean summation across k clients that encodes private bits as permutation matrices in the Birkhoff polytope. A two-layer architecture gives the server perfect simulation-based security (statistical distance zero) while a separate aggregator faces \#P-hard likelihood inference via the permanent and mixed discriminant. Two variants (full and compressed) differ in what the aggregator observes. We develop a finite-sample (\varepsilon,\delta)-DP analysis with explicit constants. In the full variant, where the aggregator sees a doubly stochastic matrix per client, the log-Lipschitz constant grows as n^4 K_t and a signal-to-noise analysis shows the DP guarantee is non-vacuous only when the private signal is undetectable. In the compressed variant, where the aggregator sees a single scalar, the univariate density ratio yields non-vacuous \varepsilon at moderate SNR, with the optimal decoy count balancing CLT accuracy against noise concentration. This exposes a fundamental tension. \#P-hardness requires the full matrix view (Birkhoff structure visible), while non-vacuous DP requires the scalar view (low dimensionality). Whether both hold simultaneously in one variant remains open. The protocol needs no PKI, has O(k) communication, and outputs exact aggregates. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Machine Learning (cs.LG) Cite as: arXiv:2603.22808 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2603.22808v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.22808 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Praneeth Vepakomma [view email] [v1] Tue, 24 Mar 2026 05:08:38 UTC (63 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-03 Change to browse by: cs cs.LG References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Mar 25, 2026
    Archived
    Mar 25, 2026
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