Combinatorial Privacy: Private Multi-Party Bitstream Grand Sum by Hiding in Birkhoff Polytopes
arXiv SecurityArchived Mar 25, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2603.22808v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We introduce PolyVeil, a protocol for private Boolean summation across $k$ clients that encodes private bits as permutation matrices in the Birkhoff polytope. A two-layer architecture gives the server perfect simulation-based security (statistical distance zero) while a separate aggregator faces \#P-hard likelihood inference via the permanent and mixed discriminant. Two variants (full and compressed) differ in what the aggregator observes. We devel
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 24 Mar 2026]
Combinatorial Privacy: Private Multi-Party Bitstream Grand Sum by Hiding in Birkhoff Polytopes
Praneeth Vepakomma
We introduce PolyVeil, a protocol for private Boolean summation across k clients that encodes private bits as permutation matrices in the Birkhoff polytope. A two-layer architecture gives the server perfect simulation-based security (statistical distance zero) while a separate aggregator faces \#P-hard likelihood inference via the permanent and mixed discriminant. Two variants (full and compressed) differ in what the aggregator observes.
We develop a finite-sample (\varepsilon,\delta)-DP analysis with explicit constants. In the full variant, where the aggregator sees a doubly stochastic matrix per client, the log-Lipschitz constant grows as n^4 K_t and a signal-to-noise analysis shows the DP guarantee is non-vacuous only when the private signal is undetectable. In the compressed variant, where the aggregator sees a single scalar, the univariate density ratio yields non-vacuous \varepsilon at moderate SNR, with the optimal decoy count balancing CLT accuracy against noise concentration.
This exposes a fundamental tension. \#P-hardness requires the full matrix view (Birkhoff structure visible), while non-vacuous DP requires the scalar view (low dimensionality). Whether both hold simultaneously in one variant remains open. The protocol needs no PKI, has O(k) communication, and outputs exact aggregates.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.22808 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2603.22808v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.22808
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From: Praneeth Vepakomma [view email]
[v1] Tue, 24 Mar 2026 05:08:38 UTC (63 KB)
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