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CIPL: A Target-Independent Framework for Channel-Inversion Privacy Leakage in Agents

arXiv Security Archived Mar 25, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2603.22751v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents may expose sensitive information through more than their final textual responses. Whenever private content is internally selected, assembled, and reused inside an agent pipeline, an attacker may attempt to turn that hidden dependence into an observable output signal. Existing evidence of this risk is strongest for memory leakage, but current attack formulations remain largely tied to specific systems and output sur

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 24 Mar 2026] CIPL: A Target-Independent Framework for Channel-Inversion Privacy Leakage in Agents Tao Huang, Chen Hou, Jiayang Meng Large language model (LLM) agents may expose sensitive information through more than their final textual responses. Whenever private content is internally selected, assembled, and reused inside an agent pipeline, an attacker may attempt to turn that hidden dependence into an observable output signal. Existing evidence of this risk is strongest for memory leakage, but current attack formulations remain largely tied to specific systems and output surfaces. In this paper, we formulate privacy leakage in agentic systems as a \emph{channel inversion} problem and present CIPL (Channel Inversion for Privacy Leakage), a target-independent framework for studying such attacks. CIPL represents a target system through a common signature consisting of a sensitive source, selection, assembly, execution, observation, and extraction stages, and instantiates attacks through a reusable attack language built from a locator, an aligner, and a diversification policy. As a unified evaluation framework, CIPL supports cross-target comparison while preserving target-specific execution semantics. Our results provide initial evidence that privacy leakage is not confined to memory alone; instead, it depends on how sensitive content is routed into attacker-visible observation channels. These findings suggest that privacy evaluation for agentic systems should move beyond single-surface attack analysis toward a channel-oriented view of information exposure. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2603.22751 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2603.22751v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.22751 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Jiayang Meng [view email] [v1] Tue, 24 Mar 2026 03:29:39 UTC (296 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-03 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Mar 25, 2026
    Archived
    Mar 25, 2026
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