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mmFHE: mmWave Sensing with End-to-End Fully Homomorphic Encryption

arXiv Security Archived Mar 25, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2603.22437v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We present mmFHE, the first system that enables fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) for end-to-end mmWave radar sensing. mmFHE encrypts raw range profiles on a lightweight edge device and executes the entire mmWave signal-processing and ML inference pipeline homomorphically on an untrusted cloud that operates exclusively on ciphertexts. At the core of mmFHE is a library of seven composable, data-oblivious FHE kernels that replace standard DSP routin

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 23 Mar 2026] mmFHE: mmWave Sensing with End-to-End Fully Homomorphic Encryption Tanvir Ahmed, Yixuan Gao, Adnan Armouti, Rajalakshmi Nandakumar We present mmFHE, the first system that enables fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) for end-to-end mmWave radar sensing. mmFHE encrypts raw range profiles on a lightweight edge device and executes the entire mmWave signal-processing and ML inference pipeline homomorphically on an untrusted cloud that operates exclusively on ciphertexts. At the core of mmFHE is a library of seven composable, data-oblivious FHE kernels that replace standard DSP routines with fixed arithmetic circuits. These kernels can be flexibly composed into different application-specific pipelines. We demonstrate this approach on two representative tasks: vital-sign monitoring and gesture recognition. We formally prove two cryptographic guarantees for any pipeline assembled from this library: input privacy, the cloud learns nothing about the sensor data; and data obliviousness, the execution trace is identical on the cloud regardless of the data being processed. These guarantees effectively neutralize various supervised and unsupervised privacy attacks on raw data, including re-identification and data-dependent privacy leakage. Evaluation on three public radar datasets (270 vital-sign recordings, 600 gesture trials) shows that encryption introduces negligible error: HR/RR MAE <10^-3 bpm versus plaintext, and 84.5% gesture accuracy (vs. 84.7% plaintext) with end-to-end cloud GPU latency of 103s for a 10s vital-sign window and 37s for a 3s gesture window. These results show that privacy-preserving end-to-end mmWave sensing is feasible on commodity hardware today. Comments: Under review Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Machine Learning (cs.LG); Signal Processing (eess.SP) Cite as: arXiv:2603.22437 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2603.22437v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.22437 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Tanvir Ahmed [view email] [v1] Mon, 23 Mar 2026 18:09:01 UTC (1,407 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-03 Change to browse by: cs cs.LG eess eess.SP References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Mar 25, 2026
    Archived
    Mar 25, 2026
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