Are AI-assisted Development Tools Immune to Prompt Injection?
arXiv SecurityArchived Mar 24, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2603.21642v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Prompt injection is listed as the number-one vulnerability class in the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications that can subvert LLM guardrails, disclose sensitive data, and trigger unauthorized tool use. Developers are rapidly adopting AI-assisted development tools built on the Model Context Protocol (MCP). However, their convenience comes with security risks, especially prompt-injection attacks delivered via tool-poisoning vectors. While prior research
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 23 Mar 2026]
Are AI-assisted Development Tools Immune to Prompt Injection?
Charoes Huang, Xin Huang, Amin Milani Fard
Prompt injection is listed as the number-one vulnerability class in the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications that can subvert LLM guardrails, disclose sensitive data, and trigger unauthorized tool use. Developers are rapidly adopting AI-assisted development tools built on the Model Context Protocol (MCP). However, their convenience comes with security risks, especially prompt-injection attacks delivered via tool-poisoning vectors. While prior research has studied prompt injection in LLMs, the security posture of real-world MCP clients remains underexplored. We present the first empirical analysis of prompt injection with the tool-poisoning vulnerability across seven widely used MCP clients: Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, Cline, Continue, Gemini CLI, and Langflow. We identify their detection and mitigation mechanisms, as well as the coverage of security features, including static validation, parameter visibility, injection detection, user warnings, execution sandboxing, and audit logging. Our evaluation reveals significant disparities. While some clients, such as Claude Desktop, implement strong guardrails, others, such as Cursor, exhibit high susceptibility to cross-tool poisoning, hidden parameter exploitation, and unauthorized tool invocation. We further provide actionable guidance for MCP implementers and the software engineering community seeking to build secure AI-assisted development workflows.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Software Engineering (cs.SE)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.21642 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2603.21642v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.21642
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Submission history
From: Amin Milani Fard [view email]
[v1] Mon, 23 Mar 2026 07:24:11 UTC (83 KB)
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