When Convenience Becomes Risk: A Semantic View of Under-Specification in Host-Acting Agents
arXiv SecurityArchived Mar 24, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2603.21231v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Host-acting agents promise a convenient interaction model in which users specify goals and the system determines how to realize them. We argue that this convenience introduces a distinct security problem: semantic under-specification in goal specification. User instructions are typically goal-oriented, yet they often leave process constraints, safety boundaries, persistence, and exposure insufficiently specified. As a result, the agent must complet
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 22 Mar 2026]
When Convenience Becomes Risk: A Semantic View of Under-Specification in Host-Acting Agents
Di Lu, Yongzhi Liao, Xutong Mu, Lele Zheng, Ke Cheng, Xuewen Dong, Yulong Shen, Jianfeng Ma
Host-acting agents promise a convenient interaction model in which users specify goals and the system determines how to realize them. We argue that this convenience introduces a distinct security problem: semantic under-specification in goal specification. User instructions are typically goal-oriented, yet they often leave process constraints, safety boundaries, persistence, and exposure insufficiently specified. As a result, the agent must complete missing execution semantics before acting, and this completion can produce risky host-side plans even when the user-stated goal is benign. In this paper, we develop a semantic threat model, present a taxonomy of semantic-induced risky completion patterns, and study the phenomenon through an OpenClaw-centered case study and execution-trace analysis. We further derive defense design principles for making execution boundaries explicit and constraining risky completion. These findings suggest that securing host-acting agents requires governing not only which actions are allowed at execution time, but also how goal-only instructions are translated into executable plans.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.21231 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2603.21231v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.21231
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From: Di Lu [view email]
[v1] Sun, 22 Mar 2026 13:42:21 UTC (133 KB)
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