Visual Exclusivity Attacks: Automatic Multimodal Red Teaming via Agentic Planning
arXiv SecurityArchived Mar 24, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2603.20198v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Current multimodal red teaming treats images as wrappers for malicious payloads via typography or adversarial noise. These attacks are structurally brittle, as standard defenses neutralize them once the payload is exposed. We introduce Visual Exclusivity (VE), a more resilient Image-as-Basis threat where harm emerges only through reasoning over visual content such as technical schematics. To systematically exploit VE, we propose Multimodal Multi-tu
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 5 Feb 2026]
Visual Exclusivity Attacks: Automatic Multimodal Red Teaming via Agentic Planning
Yunbei Zhang, Yingqiang Ge, Weijie Xu, Yuhui Xu, Jihun Hamm, Chandan K. Reddy
Current multimodal red teaming treats images as wrappers for malicious payloads via typography or adversarial noise. These attacks are structurally brittle, as standard defenses neutralize them once the payload is exposed. We introduce Visual Exclusivity (VE), a more resilient Image-as-Basis threat where harm emerges only through reasoning over visual content such as technical schematics. To systematically exploit VE, we propose Multimodal Multi-turn Agentic Planning (MM-Plan), a framework that reframes jailbreaking from turn-by-turn reaction to global plan synthesis. MM-Plan trains an attacker planner to synthesize comprehensive, multi-turn strategies, optimized via Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), enabling self-discovery of effective strategies without human supervision. To rigorously benchmark this reasoning-dependent threat, we introduce VE-Safety, a human-curated dataset filling a critical gap in evaluating high-risk technical visual understanding. MM-Plan achieves 46.3% attack success rate against Claude 4.5 Sonnet and 13.8% against GPT-5, outperforming baselines by 2--5x where existing methods largely fail. These findings reveal that frontier models remain vulnerable to agentic multimodal attacks, exposing a critical gap in current safety alignment. Warning: This paper contains potentially harmful content.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (cs.CV); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.20198 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2603.20198v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.20198
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From: Yunbei Zhang [view email]
[v1] Thu, 5 Feb 2026 01:46:14 UTC (18,327 KB)
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