Sharing The Secret: Distributed Privacy-Preserving Monitoring
arXiv SecurityArchived Mar 23, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2603.20107v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In traditional runtime verification, a system is typically observed by a monolithic monitor. Enforcing privacy in such settings is computationally expensive, as it necessitates heavy cryptographic primitives. Therefore, privacy-preserving monitoring remains impractical for real-time applications. In this work, we address this scalability challenge by distributing the monitor across multiple parties -- at least one of which is honest. This architect
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 20 Mar 2026]
Sharing The Secret: Distributed Privacy-Preserving Monitoring
Mahyar Karimi, K. S. Thejaswini, Roderick Bloem, Thomas A. Henzinger
In traditional runtime verification, a system is typically observed by a monolithic monitor. Enforcing privacy in such settings is computationally expensive, as it necessitates heavy cryptographic primitives. Therefore, privacy-preserving monitoring remains impractical for real-time applications. In this work, we address this scalability challenge by distributing the monitor across multiple parties -- at least one of which is honest. This architecture enables the use of efficient secret-sharing schemes instead of computationally intensive cryptography, dramatically reducing over-head while maintaining strong privacy guarantees. While existing secret-sharing approaches are typically limited to one-shot executions which do not maintain an internal state, we introduce a protocol tailored for continuous monitoring that supports repeated evaluations over an evolving internal state (kept secret from the system and the monitoring entities). We implement our approach using the MP-SPDZ framework. Our experiments demonstrate that, under these architectural assumptions, our protocol is significantly more scalable than existing alternatives.
Comments: 29 pages, 1 figure
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Formal Languages and Automata Theory (cs.FL)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.20107 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2603.20107v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.20107
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Submission history
From: K. S. Thejaswini [view email]
[v1] Fri, 20 Mar 2026 16:30:57 UTC (100 KB)
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