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Sharing The Secret: Distributed Privacy-Preserving Monitoring

arXiv Security Archived Mar 23, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2603.20107v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In traditional runtime verification, a system is typically observed by a monolithic monitor. Enforcing privacy in such settings is computationally expensive, as it necessitates heavy cryptographic primitives. Therefore, privacy-preserving monitoring remains impractical for real-time applications. In this work, we address this scalability challenge by distributing the monitor across multiple parties -- at least one of which is honest. This architect

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 20 Mar 2026] Sharing The Secret: Distributed Privacy-Preserving Monitoring Mahyar Karimi, K. S. Thejaswini, Roderick Bloem, Thomas A. Henzinger In traditional runtime verification, a system is typically observed by a monolithic monitor. Enforcing privacy in such settings is computationally expensive, as it necessitates heavy cryptographic primitives. Therefore, privacy-preserving monitoring remains impractical for real-time applications. In this work, we address this scalability challenge by distributing the monitor across multiple parties -- at least one of which is honest. This architecture enables the use of efficient secret-sharing schemes instead of computationally intensive cryptography, dramatically reducing over-head while maintaining strong privacy guarantees. While existing secret-sharing approaches are typically limited to one-shot executions which do not maintain an internal state, we introduce a protocol tailored for continuous monitoring that supports repeated evaluations over an evolving internal state (kept secret from the system and the monitoring entities). We implement our approach using the MP-SPDZ framework. Our experiments demonstrate that, under these architectural assumptions, our protocol is significantly more scalable than existing alternatives. Comments: 29 pages, 1 figure Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Formal Languages and Automata Theory (cs.FL) Cite as: arXiv:2603.20107 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2603.20107v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.20107 Focus to learn more Submission history From: K. S. Thejaswini [view email] [v1] Fri, 20 Mar 2026 16:30:57 UTC (100 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-03 Change to browse by: cs cs.FL References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Mar 23, 2026
    Archived
    Mar 23, 2026
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