A Theory of Composable Lingos for Protocol Dialects
arXiv SecurityArchived Mar 23, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2603.19908v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Formal patterns are formally specified solutions to frequently occurring distributed system problems that are generic, executable, and come with strong qualitative and/or quantitative formal guarantees. A formal pattern is a generic system transformation which transforms a usually infinite class of systems in need of the pattern's solution into enhanced versions of such systems that solve the problem in question. In this paper we demonstrate the ap
Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 20 Mar 2026]
A Theory of Composable Lingos for Protocol Dialects
Víctor García, Santaigo Escobar, Catherine Meadows, Jose Meseguer
Formal patterns are formally specified solutions to frequently occurring distributed system problems that are generic, executable, and come with strong qualitative and/or quantitative formal guarantees. A formal pattern is a generic system transformation which transforms a usually infinite class of systems in need of the pattern's solution into enhanced versions of such systems that solve the problem in question. In this paper we demonstrate the application of formal patterns to protocol dialects. Dialects are methods for hardening protocols so as to endow them with light-weight security, especially against easy attacks that can lead to more serious ones. A lingo is a dialect's key security component, because attackers are unable to ''speak'' the lingo. A lingo's ''talk'' changes all the time, becoming a moving target for attackers. In this paper we present several formal patterns for both lingos and dialects. Lingo formal patterns can make lingos stronger by both transforming them and by composing several lingos into a stronger lingo. Dialects themselves can be obtained by the application of a single dialect formal pattern, generic on both the chosen lingo and the chosen protocol.
Comments: arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:2504.20637
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.19908 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2603.19908v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.19908
Focus to learn more
Submission history
From: Víctor García Valero [view email]
[v1] Fri, 20 Mar 2026 12:45:19 UTC (281 KB)
Access Paper:
HTML (experimental)
view license
Current browse context:
cs.CR
< prev | next >
new | recent | 2026-03
Change to browse by:
cs
References & Citations
NASA ADS
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Export BibTeX Citation
Bookmark
Bibliographic Tools
Bibliographic and Citation Tools
Bibliographic Explorer Toggle
Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?)
Connected Papers Toggle
Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?)
Litmaps Toggle
Litmaps (What is Litmaps?)
scite.ai Toggle
scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?)
Code, Data, Media
Demos
Related Papers
About arXivLabs
Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)