Case Study: Horizontal Side-Channel Analysis Attack against Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication Accelerator under Laser Illumination
arXiv SecurityArchived Mar 23, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2603.19811v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Devices employing cryptographic approaches have to be resistant to physical attacks. Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) and Fault Injection (FI) attacks are frequently used to reveal cryptographic keys. In this paper, we present a combined SCA and laser illumination attack against an Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication accelerator using a differential probe from Teledyne LeCroy. Our experiments show that laser illumination increases the power consumption
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 20 Mar 2026]
Case Study: Horizontal Side-Channel Analysis Attack against Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication Accelerator under Laser Illumination
Dmytro Petryk, Ievgen Kabin, Peter Langendoerfer, Zoya Dyka
Devices employing cryptographic approaches have to be resistant to physical attacks. Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) and Fault Injection (FI) attacks are frequently used to reveal cryptographic keys. In this paper, we present a combined SCA and laser illumination attack against an Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication accelerator using a differential probe from Teledyne LeCroy. Our experiments show that laser illumination increases the power consumption of the chip, especially its static power consumption but the success of the horizontal power analysis attacks was changed insignificantly. We assume that using a laser with a high laser beam power and concentrating on measuring and analysing only static current can improve the attack success significantly. The horizontal attacks against public key cryptosystems exploiting the Static Consumption under Laser Illumination (SCuLI attacks) are novel and their potential is not investigated yet. These attacks can be especially dangerous against cryptographic chips manufactured in scaled technologies. If such attacks are feasible, appropriate countermeasures have to be proposed in the future.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Hardware Architecture (cs.AR)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.19811 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2603.19811v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.19811
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Related DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1109/LATS65346.2025.10963958
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Submission history
From: Dmytro Petryk [view email]
[v1] Fri, 20 Mar 2026 09:56:20 UTC (916 KB)
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