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Operationalizing Cyber Threat Intelligence with GraphRAG

arXiv Security Archived Aug 14, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2608.13050v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: When a security researcher publishes a report on a cyberattack, detection engineers are supposed to turn it into working detection rules. In practice, most automated attempts at this only extract the simplest clues from the report --- bad IP addresses, domain names, and file hashes --- and turn them into block lists. This is a weak strategy, because attackers can change these simple clues within hours or days, so the resulting detections stop worki

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 13 Aug 2026] Operationalizing Cyber Threat Intelligence with GraphRAG Atul Kabra, Prakhar Paliwal, Manjesh K. Hanawal When a security researcher publishes a report on a cyberattack, detection engineers are supposed to turn it into working detection rules. In practice, most automated attempts at this only extract the simplest clues from the report --- bad IP addresses, domain names, and file hashes --- and turn them into block lists. This is a weak strategy, because attackers can change these simple clues within hours or days, so the resulting detections stop working almost as soon as they are deployed. Security teams describe this idea with the Pyramid of Pain. This project asks whether feeding a report into a knowledge-graph retrieval system, Microsoft GraphRAG, rather than a standard vector-similarity retrieval system (Naive RAG), produces detection plans that rely more on these durable, top-of-pyramid clues. Both systems are given the same report, the same generation instructions, and the same language model to write the final plan; only the retrieval step differs. In a detailed case study of one APT28 report, the GraphRAG plan kept firing at 100\% of its detections after every IP address, domain, and file hash in the report was rotated, while the Naive RAG plan kept firing at only 29\%. Repeating the comparison across nine real CTI reports from four vendors confirms the same pattern: GraphRAG plans consistently reach higher, harder-to-evade levels of the pyramid, even when the two systems end up close on total score. The results support treating knowledge-graph-aware retrieval as the architecturally correct foundation for automatically generating SOC-deployable hunting plans, while showing that the wording of the generation prompt matters almost as much as the retrieval back-end itself. Comments: 12 pages Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2608.13050 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2608.13050v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.13050 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Manjesh Kumar Hanawal [view email] [v1] Thu, 13 Aug 2026 10:15:05 UTC (500 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-08 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Aug 14, 2026
    Archived
    Aug 14, 2026
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