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ATOBench: Tracing How Autonomous Penetration-Testing Agents Verify Vulnerabilities When Target Evidence Lies

arXiv Security Archived Aug 14, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2608.12996v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Autonomous penetration-testing agents rely on target responses. These responses guide both subsequent actions and the final report. A deceptive response can therefore redirect both the attack trajectory and the agent's verification process. However, final reports reveal little about how an agent interprets conflicting evidence, changes course, decides to stop, or turns observations into a vulnerability claim. We introduce ATOBench, an evaluation fr

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 13 Aug 2026] ATOBench: Tracing How Autonomous Penetration-Testing Agents Verify Vulnerabilities When Target Evidence Lies Qiyang Chen, Yixi Li, Fengwei Zhang, Junlin Liu Autonomous penetration-testing agents rely on target responses. These responses guide both subsequent actions and the final report. A deceptive response can therefore redirect both the attack trajectory and the agent's verification process. However, final reports reveal little about how an agent interprets conflicting evidence, changes course, decides to stop, or turns observations into a vulnerability claim. We introduce ATOBench, an evaluation framework that makes this verification process observable. ATOBench injects registered response transformations at runtime and pairs each transformed episode with a native episode under the same environment. Each pair is aligned at the first affected response. A source-linked reconstruction then follows later actions, evidence recovery, stopping, and report support. Three frozen observation contracts cover exploit proof, resource ownership, and reusable artifacts. We evaluate five model routes over 450 episodes. The analysis shows that increased activity can mask a broken verification chain, while successful recovery depends on finding usable evidence and preserving it through reporting. ATOBench turns deceptive target observations into a reproducible probe of evidence handling in autonomous penetration testing. This process-level view extends offensive pentest agent evaluation beyond final outcomes by revealing how untrusted observations shape actions, verification, and reporting. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2608.12996 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2608.12996v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.12996 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Junlin Liu [view email] [v1] Thu, 13 Aug 2026 09:20:45 UTC (1,946 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-08 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Aug 14, 2026
    Archived
    Aug 14, 2026
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