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Labels Are Not Endpoints: Treatment Leakage and Construct Validity in MCP Agent Security Evaluation

arXiv Security Archived Aug 14, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2608.12880v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Security evaluations of tool-using agents often equate stored labels with behavioral facts. We audit a preserved campaign by tracing 10,200 execution rows to 180 model-bound requests, 45 semantic requests, and 15 observable stimuli. Two schema treatments were delivered, but the planned external payload-family corpus was not. The historical grader exhibited direct treatment leakage: treatment metadata gated the ATTACK_SUCCESS class, so fixed behavio

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 13 Aug 2026] Labels Are Not Endpoints: Treatment Leakage and Construct Validity in MCP Agent Security Evaluation Rana Muhammad Ahmed (Department of Computer Science, Bahria University, Islamabad, Pakistan), Sabahat Abbas (Department of Computer Science, Bahria University, Islamabad, Pakistan) Security evaluations of tool-using agents often equate stored labels with behavioral facts. We audit a preserved campaign by tracing 10,200 execution rows to 180 model-bound requests, 45 semantic requests, and 15 observable stimuli. Two schema treatments were delivered, but the planned external payload-family corpus was not. The historical grader exhibited direct treatment leakage: treatment metadata gated the ATTACK_SUCCESS class, so fixed behavior could change class under treatment relabeling. A treatment-blind reconstruction corrects 58 historical ATTACK_SUCCESS or HIJACK_ATTEMPT labels to authorized benign completions while preserving three verified protected-data transfers and one separate unauthorized-forwarding case. The locked v2 census contains exactly zero ATTACK_SUCCESS records, while the forwarding case remains a HIJACK_ATTEMPT at a semantic boundary concerning objective completion. A dual-reviewer blinded concordance review of all 96 requests deemed structurally interpretable by locked v2 produced identical reviewer-consensus classes but differed from the locked codebook on four construct-boundary cases. We contribute a seven-link Integrity Chain and an executable, scope-bounded endpoint-integrity linter. The result is a campaign-bounded measurement audit, not a population attack-rate, model-ranking, defense-efficacy, or causal estimate. Comments: 24 pages, 10 figures, 4 tables. Preprint Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2608.12880 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2608.12880v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.12880 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Rana Muhammad Ahmed [view email] [v1] Thu, 13 Aug 2026 06:44:40 UTC (229 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-08 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Aug 14, 2026
    Archived
    Aug 14, 2026
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