A Runtime Decentralized Attestation and Coordinated Repair Framework for Securing Automotive ECUs

Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 11 Aug 2026] A Runtime Decentralized Attestation and Coordinated Repair Framework for Securing Automotive ECUs Josh Dafoe, Niusen Chen, Bo Chen The evolution of automotive technology increasingly integrates components, transforming vehicles into interconnected systems of systems. Modern vehicles are controlled by a distributed system of computing devices, known as electronic control units (ECUs). However, this interconnectedness means that any error poses significant risks to the vehicle operator. In particular, malware can be injected into ECUs, threatening vehicle safety. To address this, we need mechanisms to detect compromised ECUs then repair them to a benign state. Existing approaches mainly focus on detection and do not address the challenge of integrating detection with runtime ECU repair. This integration is nontrivial because runtime repair involves both local rollback and reboot with timing determined from global vehicle context to avoid unsafe behavior. In this work, we have designed DACER, a runtime decentralized attestation and coordinated repair framework for automotive ECUs. DACER is the first approach that co-designs attestation and repair to unify the ``local'' nature of firmware rollback with the ``global'' nature of ECU reboot. In DACER, each ECU performs efficient local self-attestation and self-repair functions, enabling low-overhead coordination for distributed operations. In addition, DACER takes advantage of the hierarchical vehicle computing architecture. Our resulting DACER design checks the entire state of the vehicle, resists single points of failure, conforms to real-time constraints, and enables firmware restoration during runtime. The key functions are enabled by the ARM TrustZone equipped within each ECU and the secure flash memory controller embedded in the storage device. We implemented DACER on real-world hardware and experimentally demonstrated its low overhead. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2608.11489 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2608.11489v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.11489 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Josh Dafoe [view email] [v1] Tue, 11 Aug 2026 23:02:49 UTC (10,833 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-08 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)