An Empirical Study of Output-to-Input Loops for Black-Box Backdoor Detection in Fine-Tuned Open-Weight LLMs
arXiv SecurityArchived Aug 13, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2608.11348v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Anyone can upload a fine-tuned large language model (LLM) to a public repository and claim it is safe. A backdoored model behaves normally on ordinary inputs until a hidden trigger fires, and a user with no training data, clean reference weights, or the trigger phrase has no clear way to check the model before using it. We introduce and empirically evaluate self-feeding, a black-box test method that feeds a model's own output back as its next input
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 11 Aug 2026]
An Empirical Study of Output-to-Input Loops for Black-Box Backdoor Detection in Fine-Tuned Open-Weight LLMs
Md. Nahid Hasan, Mohammad Arif Hossain
Anyone can upload a fine-tuned large language model (LLM) to a public repository and claim it is safe. A backdoored model behaves normally on ordinary inputs until a hidden trigger fires, and a user with no training data, clean reference weights, or the trigger phrase has no clear way to check the model before using it. We introduce and empirically evaluate self-feeding, a black-box test method that feeds a model's own output back as its next input, so the text drifts away from the starting prompt and toward the data the model was fine-tuned on. We test self-feeding against a repeated same-prompt baseline on six open-weight LLMs (3B-15B parameters), each fine-tuned with backdoors spanning eleven attack categories, using twenty ordinary starting prompts and chains of up to ten steps. Self-feeding finds backdoors in five of six models at 92.0\% pooled precision, while the same-prompt baseline succeeds on only one of 120 prompt-model pairs; chains that begin with a joke request, an arithmetic question, or a coffee recipe all reach a trigger within a few steps. Recall per prompt is low (19.2\%), and we show why it still adds up to much higher detection at the model level once several starting prompts are used. We also report where the method falls short: one model was never triggered, and self-feeding produced two false positives that the same-prompt baseline cannot produce. Cutting the chains to four steps keeps every model-level detection at 100\% precision while using 60\% fewer queries. Needing only text-level query access and a way to recognize malicious output, self-feeding offers a cheap first check on a downloaded model.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2608.11348 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2608.11348v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.11348
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From: Md. Nahid Hasan [view email]
[v1] Tue, 11 Aug 2026 18:53:49 UTC (1,293 KB)
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