CyberIntel ⬡ News
★ Saved ◆ Cyber Reads
← Back ◬ AI & Machine Learning Aug 13, 2026

Backdoor Decontamination Dynamics in LLM Agents

arXiv Security Archived Aug 13, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2608.11295v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Open-weight LLM agents are vulnerable to backdoors installed during fine-tuning, which may be undetectable if the trigger conditions are never met during testing. Assuming defenders do not know the existing trigger, they cannot unlearn it directly. One decontamination strategy is to install a known backdoor (defensive poisoning) then to unlearn it, hoping that the original unknown backdoor is removed as a side effect. However, this procedure has un

Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary · Claude Sonnet


    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 11 Aug 2026] Backdoor Decontamination Dynamics in LLM Agents Gabriel Huang, Abhay Puri, Léo Boisvert, Alexandre Drouin, Perouz Taslakian, Spandana Gella, Christopher Pal Open-weight LLM agents are vulnerable to backdoors installed during fine-tuning, which may be undetectable if the trigger conditions are never met during testing. Assuming defenders do not know the existing trigger, they cannot unlearn it directly. One decontamination strategy is to install a known backdoor (defensive poisoning) then to unlearn it, hoping that the original unknown backdoor is removed as a side effect. However, this procedure has uncertain outcomes: the original backdoor may persist or be erased or rerouted, among other possibilities. We introduce a framework for studying these dynamics in tool-calling agents, decoupling trigger, response, teacher, and fine-tuning method across systematic experiments on AgentDyn. Across 115 experiments, defensive poisoning alone erases around 56% of original backdoors; subsequent decontamination then drives almost all survivors to erasure, confirming that trigger recognition and malicious execution are behaviorally dissociable. Interestingly, our experiments find that malicious backdoors never persist when using different triggers of the same general type as the defensive backdoor when followed by decontamination via unlearning. Co-installing up to four backdoors increases resistance (around 36% erased), yet decontaminating a single known co-resident backdoor collaterally clears 52/60 co-residents (87%). Upon visualizing postdecontamination model internals using J-lens, we confirm that although the decontamination restores benign LLM responses, traces of original trigger awareness persist at intermediate layers. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2608.11295 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2608.11295v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.11295 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Léo Boisvert [view email] [v1] Tue, 11 Aug 2026 17:54:26 UTC (14,484 KB) Access Paper: view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-08 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
    💬 Team Notes
    Article Info
    Source
    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Aug 13, 2026
    Archived
    Aug 13, 2026
    Full Text
    ✓ Saved locally
    Open Original ↗