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Trigger the Straggler: Load Hijack on Mixture-of-Experts LLMs

arXiv Security Archived Aug 12, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2608.10614v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Expert parallelism (EP) is a common strategy for serving large Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) models across multiple GPUs by distributing experts among devices. Router decisions then determine both which experts process each token and which GPUs execute the resulting work. This procedure exposes a supply-chain attack surface in the serving schedule. We introduce Load Hijack, in which a malicious model provider modifies only a checkpoint's router weights,

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 11 Aug 2026] Trigger the Straggler: Load Hijack on Mixture-of-Experts LLMs Rui Zhang, Wenbo Jiang, Hongwei Li, Zihan Wang, Rui Zhang, Chaoshun Zuo, Jianfei Sun, Guowen Xu Expert parallelism (EP) is a common strategy for serving large Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) models across multiple GPUs by distributing experts among devices. Router decisions then determine both which experts process each token and which GPUs execute the resulting work. This procedure exposes a supply-chain attack surface in the serving schedule. We introduce Load Hijack, in which a malicious model provider modifies only a checkpoint's router weights, distributes the poisoned checkpoint, and retains a private trigger. When the trigger appears, the poisoned router concentrates token-to-expert assignments on experts co-located on one GPU. The resulting load makes that GPU a straggler and forces peer devices to wait, while routing on ordinary inputs remains near the clean reference. We find this conditional behavior difficult to achieve because an objective that rewards target-expert use on triggered inputs can also bias ordinary-input routing toward the same experts. To resolve this conflict, Load Hijack employs a three-stage optimization procedure that produces strong trigger-dependent concentration while keeping ordinary-input routing close to the clean reference. Across three MoE families and four corpora, Load Hijack directs 92.3% to 95.6% of triggered token assignments to the target experts. In live EP serving, triggered traffic produces 1.43x the time-to-first-token and 0.86x the throughput measured under ordinary traffic. These results show that poisoned routers can act as trigger-controlled device schedulers and motivate checkpoint audits of routing and runtime load. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2608.10614 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2608.10614v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.10614 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Rui Zhang [view email] [v1] Tue, 11 Aug 2026 07:57:22 UTC (497 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-08 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Aug 12, 2026
    Archived
    Aug 12, 2026
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