Telemetry and Concealment in Self-Adapting Generative AI: Logging Architecture, Adversarial Model Hiding, and the Limits of Detection
arXiv SecurityArchived Aug 11, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2608.09069v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Model risk management (MRM) guidance assumes a static model lifecycle, in which models are developed, independently validated, and implemented without further autonomous modification. Continually self-adapting generative AI systems --- models that update their own weights during production deployment --- fundamentally violate this assumption and render point-in-time validation inadequate. This paper addresses the resulting governance problem in two
Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 10 Aug 2026]
Telemetry and Concealment in Self-Adapting Generative AI: Logging Architecture, Adversarial Model Hiding, and the Limits of Detection
Sriram Nagaraj
Model risk management (MRM) guidance assumes a static model lifecycle, in which models are developed, independently validated, and implemented without further autonomous modification. Continually self-adapting generative AI systems --- models that update their own weights during production deployment --- fundamentally violate this assumption and render point-in-time validation inadequate. This paper addresses the resulting governance problem in two parts. Part I develops a rigorous telemetry architecture for such models, operating simultaneously in discrete and continuous time. We establish a Minimal Sufficient Statistic for audit purposes, construct a tamper-evident Merkle chain for discrete weight sequences, derive the appropriate continuous-time generalization via the Ito formula, and propose event-driven logging via KL divergence stopping times that is both computationally tractable and meaningful for validation. Part II asks what happens when the model provider is adversarial. A firm deploying such a model has strong incentives to conceal learning updates that would trigger mandatory validation review. We formalize this as the Model Hiding Problem and provide a systematic taxonomy of six distinct attack strategies against the Part I architecture, spanning discrete and continuous time, with a formal countermeasure for each. Together the two parts establish a dual-regime architecture in which continuous telemetry is necessary but not sufficient, narrowing---but never replacing---periodic invasive audit. The framework is model-architecture-agnostic and is designed to satisfy the three pillars of traditional MRM.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Numerical Analysis (math.NA); Risk Management (q-fin.RM)
Cite as: arXiv:2608.09069 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2608.09069v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.09069
Focus to learn more
Submission history
From: Sriram Nagaraj [view email]
[v1] Mon, 10 Aug 2026 03:20:06 UTC (591 KB)
Access Paper:
HTML (experimental)
view license
Current browse context:
cs.CR
< prev | next >
new | recent | 2026-08
Change to browse by:
cs
cs.NA
math
math.NA
q-fin
q-fin.RM
References & Citations
NASA ADS
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Export BibTeX Citation
Bookmark
Bibliographic Tools
Bibliographic and Citation Tools
Bibliographic Explorer Toggle
Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?)
Connected Papers Toggle
Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?)
Litmaps Toggle
Litmaps (What is Litmaps?)
scite.ai Toggle
scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?)
Code, Data, Media
Demos
Related Papers
About arXivLabs
Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)