One Key Good, L Keys Better: List Decoding Meets Quantum Privacy Amplification
arXiv QuantumArchived Mar 20, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2603.18097v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We introduce list privacy amplification (LPA), a relaxation of the final step of quantum key distribution (QKD) in which Alice and Bob extract a list of $L$ candidate keys from a raw string correlated with an eavesdropper Eve, with the guarantee that at least one key is perfectly secret while Eve cannot identify which. This parallels list decoding in error-correcting codes: relaxing unique decoding to list decoding increases the decoding radius; an
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Quantum Physics
[Submitted on 18 Mar 2026]
One Key Good, L Keys Better: List Decoding Meets Quantum Privacy Amplification
Prateek P. Kulkarni
We introduce list privacy amplification (LPA), a relaxation of the final step of quantum key distribution (QKD) in which Alice and Bob extract a list of L candidate keys from a raw string correlated with an eavesdropper Eve, with the guarantee that at least one key is perfectly secret while Eve cannot identify which. This parallels list decoding in error-correcting codes: relaxing unique decoding to list decoding increases the decoding radius; analogously, list extraction increases achievable key length beyond the standard quantum leftover hash lemma (QLHL). Within the abstract cryptography framework, we formalise LPA and prove the \emph{Quantum List Leftover Hash Lemma} (QLLHL): an L-list of \ell-bit keys can be extracted from an n-bit source with smooth min-entropy k iff \ell \le k + \log L - 2\log(1/\epsilon) - 3,
yielding a tight additive \log L gain over QLHL. This gain arises because the index of the secure key is chosen after hashing and hidden from Eve, effectively contributing \log L bits of entropy. Applying QLLHL to BB84-type QKD, a list size L = 2^{\alpha n'} increases the tolerable phase-error threshold from h^{-1}(1 - h(e_b)) to h^{-1}(1 - h(e_b) + \alpha), exceeding the standard \approx 11\% bound for any \alpha > 0. We prove tightness via a matching intercept-resend attack, establish composability with Wegman--Carter authentication, and present two constructions: a polynomial inner-product hash over \mathbb{F}_{2^m} and a Toeplitz-based variant, running in O(nL) and O(nL \log n) time.
Comments: 18 pages
Subjects: Quantum Physics (quant-ph); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.18097 [quant-ph]
(or arXiv:2603.18097v1 [quant-ph] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.18097
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Submission history
From: Prateek P. Kulkarni [view email]
[v1] Wed, 18 Mar 2026 10:37:05 UTC (19 KB)
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