BASIS: Breach-Aware Selective Prompt Injection Shielding with Prefill Attention Probes
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arXiv:2608.08027v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Prompt injection is a critical security threat in large language model (LLM) applications, where attackers hijack model behavior by embedding malicious instructions in user or external data. Existing detection methods only detect the presence of injection and refuse to respond upon detection, overlooking the fact that for many modern aligned models, well-crafted instructions can resist most injection attacks. This means that the injection robustnes
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 8 Aug 2026]
BASIS: Breach-Aware Selective Prompt Injection Shielding with Prefill Attention Probes
Laiqiao Qin, Tianqing Zhu, Longxiang Gao, Wanlei Zhou
Prompt injection is a critical security threat in large language model (LLM) applications, where attackers hijack model behavior by embedding malicious instructions in user or external data. Existing detection methods only detect the presence of injection and refuse to respond upon detection, overlooking the fact that for many modern aligned models, well-crafted instructions can resist most injection attacks. This means that the injection robustness varies significantly across instructions and models. This leads to widespread unnecessary over-refusal: inputs containing injections that the model could have handled correctly are rejected incorrectly. To deal with this over-refusal issue, we propose BASIS (Robustness-Aware Prompt Injection Defense). This defense method uses the Attention Competition Ratio (
ρ
) as features to train two sparse linear probes: an existence probe and a breach probe. Both probes make defense decisions through cascaded gating, which does not require additional LLM inference. BASIS comprises three stages: injection existence detection, per-sample breach prediction, and instruction robustness assessment; the online cascade refuses only when the model would actually be compromised and thus avoids over-refusal on robust instructions. Experiments across four tasks and six open-source LLMs show that BASIS maintains near-perfect injection detection while substantially reducing over-refusal on safe attack samples, especially under robust instruction templates.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
Cite as: arXiv:2608.08027 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2608.08027v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.08027
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From: Laiqiao Qin [view email]
[v1] Sat, 8 Aug 2026 09:32:07 UTC (1,112 KB)
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